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SUMMARY
Introduction
This is a report about the development and delivery of economic and policy analysis in the
agriculture and agri-food sector in New Zealand and how government reform has affected this
activity.
This report was prepared to assist the federal government of Canada in its decisions regarding
the future of its current Policy Branch in its agricultural ministry, Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada (AAFC). In 1994 the Office of the Auditor General of Canada publ~shed a report
Toward Better Governance in which it examined the New Zealand experience in the reform of
its public service. In the February 1995 Budget thePOederal Government in Canada indicated
that the Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate (EPAD) 'Ya.s acandidate for privatisation.
This report examines how managerial reform in government along with economic reform has
affected the development and delivery of economic and policy analysis in government and in
industry in New Zealand. It highlights issues relevant to Canada as Canadian governments deal
with reform and privatization of activities traditionally supplied by government.
Background
With the installation of the new Labour government in 1984 all existing agricultural subsidies
were withdrawn. Since agriculture remains a very important sector in the New Zealand
economy, where 60 percent of total exports are agriculturally related, New Zealand provides a
useful case study for countries like Canada which are in the process of reassessing (reforming)
the role of government in the economy as well as in the agricultural sector.
The basis for managerial reform in the New Zealand government stems from the introduction
of two pieces of legislation, the State Sector Act (1988) and the Public Finance Act (1989).
These in turn have resulted from the conceptual development of a new vision for the
management of government developed largely in The Treasury in the 1980s. The intention
was to replace the Westminster approach of government with a contracts approach. Under
this system the traditional head of a department (i.e. Deputy Minister) has been replaced with a
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is under contract to the government (Minister) to deliver
services as targeted outputs. Based on principal/agent theory which was one of the main
elements of the new management it places the Minister in the role as principal and the CEO as
agent. The CEO enters into an annual contract for the delivery of services as outputs. The
CEO in turn contracts· with.his/.her-par.tiGular--"Qepartmental-sta:ff.to deliver-the actual outputs.
Assessment of the Current Situation in New Zealand
The Ministry of Agriculture has undergone a major restructuring from 1984 to the present in
terms of privatization of a number of its previous functions such as extension and user pays for
inspection services. It has seen its science research function shifted to a Ministry of Science.
Agriculture, however, has retained its in-house policy unit (Agriculture Policy) for the delivery
of economic and policy analysis. At no time did government seriously consider privatising this
function although there are indications that it was considered. It was not likely considered by
MAF itself
v
The Agricultural Policy bureau has remained relatively unchanged in terms of staff numbers.
What has changed is the composition of the staff There are less qualified professionals in the
policy unit in terms of level of professional training than previously. The assessment is that
MAF is no longer a mainline Ministry and is primarily relegated to the delivery of technical
services and information. In large part this is the result of the government adopting a "laissez-
faire" policy toward the economy where it has focused on managing the macro side of the
economy and leaving the micro side to the free market. The observation that the quality of
MAF staff, with obvious implications for quality of output, is supported by the view expressed
by the outgoing CEO ofMAF Dr Russ Ballard. In the March 1996 issue ofMAF Update Dr
Ballard was quoted as saying: "I hope that there's an opportunity to re-examine the amount of
output the minister expects this organisation to deliver. I believe we're already too lean. We
don't have the money to invest in staff training and internal info-structures. You can keep this
up for a while, but then your quality is going to start to-slip;" (p.1)
A further assessment is that the New Zealand government has not fully sorted out the role that
it sees for itself in the future development of the country's agriculture and food sector. MAF's
Vision includes the statement of"Communities and industries that are managing their resources
in partnership", but it is not obvious how the government sees how that partnership is to be
developed with industry, and with the broader educational and research community.
One of the manifestations of government reform in relation to the agricultural sector is the
developing independence of the agricultural sector and businesses. The industries examined,
meat, dairy and wool, all have centralised organisations with their own dedicated economic and
policy analytical units. These units function largely to provide advice for the commercial
operations and policies of the industry. These industries make limited use of economic and
policy analysis from MAF. In addition there is no indication based on the industries surveyed
that the industries in agriculture are requesting any economic analysis from MAF Agriculture
Policy. Should the government consider privatising the Agriculture Policy unit in MAF and
thus making it commercial, it is unlikely that it could find a ready market for its services in the
private sector. That is, if Canada were to look to New Zealand as a model to reform its
economic and policy analytical unit it would not privatise it except possibly in a very limited
way. The industries surveyed, however, including New Zealand Federated Farmers Inc. (the
country's largest farm organisation) all felt that the government should maintain an in-house
dedicated economic and policy analytical unit in the Agricultural Ministry.
The academic community currently plays a limited role in providing economic and policy
analysis for government or industry. In previous years,prior to reform and the elimination of
subsidies, academics played a much larger role in the development of policies and programs for
the delivery of government services and in the evaluation of those policies and programs. At
present the policy -agenda is .. mtlchnarrowef and there- is: 'less .den.iand by government for
analysis from the academic community_ This is unfortunate as there is a real need for analysis
of the changing structure and performance of the agricultural and food sector with the
introduction of reforms to the economy and to government itself.
There is evidence that the process of reform is not fully resolved. The government has gone to
great lengths to imbed the reforms and managerial process ofgovernment in statute. One pillar
of this is the Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) which contains principles governing fiscal
management. Many see the introduction of the new Mixed Member Proportional voting
system in 1996 as a further move to entrench reforms or as some see it as a means of stopping
further reforms.
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There seems to be general public acceptance for the need to have eliminated the annual fiscal
deficits, the level of debt in relation to GDP, and the sale of unproductive state owned
enterprises, but there is less acceptance for other aspects of reform that are affecting the
quality of life especially the areas of health, education and social services. The government
has been able to eliminate the deficits but it has done so largely by raising revenues through
taxes and increasing dividends from state owned enterprises rather than by reducing
expenditures. In recent weeks the government has announced a reduction in income taxes
which will largely benefit the middle income group. There was noticeably no increase in
support for those unemployed and on assistance. The Prime Minister stated that this was
deliberate as it would provide those on assistance with an added incentive to get off support.
There would also appear to be a growing debate over the managerial process of government.
This is coming from both· inside government and the academic community. It is one- of the
hypotheses of this paper that the intellectualism that existed in government that provided the
basis for reform both in terms of economicreform and managerial reform of government may
no longer be in place to now monitor and further guide the reform process. And without this,
there is the risk that reform will not reach the optimum in terms of the roles of government for
the future development of the New Zealand economy. This would seem to be particularly
critical in the case of agriculture where the implications of reduced protection and subsidisation
of agricultural and food industries following the latest GATT agreement, calls for efficiency
and effectiveness in order for agriculture to be competitive in an increasingly globalized
market.
Lessons for Canada
If the federal government in Canada follows the New Zealand model and concentrates on
macro economic policy and leaves to the market, and hence the private sector, the micro
development and management policies it should expect to see economic and policy analysis
begin to flow to those departments of government that are responsible for macro policy,
Treasury and the Reserve Bank in the case of New Zealand. Like New Zealand, agriculture
will cease to be an important area for federal responsibility except for trade, and certain areas
that require third party regulation. This of course depends on the role that the federal
government in Canada envisions itself playing in future for the development of the agriculture
and food sector.
If Canada follows what has happened in New Zealand as a result of reform and generally
adopts a policy of non-intervention in the economy .except for the management of macro
economics in terms of monetary and fiscal policy it will find that the private sector will look
inward and not to government for its future development except in certain areas.~. These areas
would include trade in terms of improviiig market access, and regulation where ne'cessary.
Based on the New Zealand situation there will be an important role for government in the area
of agricultural sustainability although it is not clear what role the federal government should
play in Canada given the paramount provincial jurisdiction in this area. Although the New
Zealand government had recognised early on the problems of economic and social adjustments
in rural areas it is now just starting to recognise the role that it will have to play in resolving
the social problems of adjustment in agriculture. Similarly, although there had been
recognition of the problems of risk and uncertainty in agriculture there would appear to be
inadequate attention now being paid for the development of risk management strategies for
farmers and the industry.
Vll
It is the position of this paper that the New Zealand government may have undervalued and
underestimated its role in the development of an efficient and effective agriculture and food
industry. It is not fully clear why government has tended to minimise its role. In part it could
be explained by a lack of leadership in government to establish a clear vision for New Zealand
agriculture in the 21 st century and the role that government must play to achieve that vision.
One would have expected that the new managerialism would have contributed to this process.
As the Auditor General of Canada's report suggests, the New Zealand approach has had a
positive effect of concentrating the focus of Ministers on what they wish to accomplish. It is
stated in the report that: "In New Zealand, clarity of objectives was recognised as a key
principle behind management reforms; this, together with acceptance of the outcomes/outputs
distinction logically led to an extensive separation of policy and operational responsibilities."
The vision statement (MAP's Vision) seems to say all the right things in terms of developing an
efficient, effective and profitable agri-food industry but the outputs that are called for in the
Purchase Agreement do not appear to be commensurate in relation to the outcomes delineated
for government to playa meaningful role in agriculture's development.
It is the one of the main conclusions of this study that the new managerialism that has been
adopted in New Zealand for government should not be fully adopted in Canada without great
care and caution. There is much to commend what reform in New Zealand has accomplished
under the new management approach, especially in terms of its transparency and certain
elements of its accountability. But there are apparent weaknesses in the new management
system which the Auditor General of Canada's report acknowledged but did not fully examine.
There is still much to learn about the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the new model of
government organisation and management in New Zealand for the delivery of economic and
policy analysis for government, and its implications for the agri-food sector.
Vlll
PREFACE
This Discussion Paper examines Government reform in New Zealand. However, Dr Gary
Storey brings a Canadian perspective to this analysis. Canada has lagged behind other GECD
countries with respect to economic reform, understandably so in the face of political
uncertainty in the last 20 years, but is now reappraising its policy. It is both interesting and
valuable to have a Canadian's view of the rather radical reforms in New Zealand's agricultural
policy and in the delivery of economic and policy analysis in the agriculture and agri-food
sector. This Discussion Paper will be of interest to all students of the reform process, and
provides another outsider's view ofthe New Zealand "experiment in agricultural policy reform.
ACZwart
DIRECTOR
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SECTION ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1 Justification and Need for the Study
Canada is facing a set of problems and issues that require it to examine closely the role of
government in the economy and society in general. This is in large part precipitated by an ever
increasing national debt as a result of successive years of fiscal deficits., The decision to
reduce expenditure implies a lessened interventionist role in the economy. It also causes
government to look to where it can commercialise and privatise to obtain cost recovery and to
reduce costs. Less government implies a lessened need for a bureaucracy to deliver services
which would include economic and policy advice. In the case of Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada (AAFC) the government is in the process of deciding on the future of the Department
and its role. In the 1995 Federal Budget the Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate
(EPAD), Policy Branch, AAFC was identified as a candidate for privatisation. In the process,
various approaches that have been followed in other countries are being examined.
Of all the developed economies New Zealand stands out as the one country that would appear
to have made the most drastic adjustments in the role of the public sector in the general
economy. New Zealand, therefore, becomes a useful case study of what happens when
government decides to playa smaller and different role in the economy and society.
Since the agricultural sector has had a prominent place in the development of New Zealand
and remains one of the most important export sectors, New Zealand becomes especially
important as that case study. What implications have the new policies had for agriculture?
What were the structural adjustments that were carried out? What have been the institutional
changes that have affected the agricultural and food industries? What have been the
bureaucratic responses?
In order to understand how the changed role of government has affected the overall
agricultural and food sector it is necessary to understand the role that government has played
in the economic development of New Zealand. This is examined only briefly in the study as it
is a subject for a separate study. There are, however, numerous books, reports, etc. that
adequately provide this background, (J. B. Condliffe andW. T. G. Airey, 1953; J. B.
Condliffe, 1959; Bollard, Alan, and Robert Buckle, 1987; Walker, Simon et al. Editors, 1989).
The central question fdf'the study is, how is agrictilttiral'p6licycurreiitly developed and
implemented in New Zealand? This provides the major rational and focus for the study. If it
is assumed that government must play a role in the further and future development of the
agricultural and food sector, how can it best and most economically obtain the required
economic and policy analysis for these decisions? Does it require an internal dedicated group
of economic analysts and policy advisors or can government effectively downsize its
permanent staff and rely on outside consultants? Is there some optimal balance between the
two? The study attempts to answer this question in the context of the New Zealand
experience to date .
Under a philosophy of true "laissez-faire' does government need economic and policy analysis
at all? To what degree-is this philosophy held by government, by the ministries responsible for
1
agriculture and those that affect agriculture directly and indirectly? What is the current
opinion in New Zealand on these issues? What has New-Zealand learned after ten years of
reform?
1.2 Background Questions and Issues
The role of government in the economic and social development of developed economies is
undergoing a process of examination and change in most Western democracies. This has been
precipitated by society's concern over increasing tax burdens, increased debt and the cost of
debt servicing. It has also been affected by a general change in philosophy that the market
(private sector) can do a better job of allocating resources for economic development. There
is growing evidence that after nearly six decades of increasing direct government involvement
in the economy, society is about ready to accept a ,return to a more "laissez-faire" economic
and political system that existed in most Western economies prior to the Great Depression of
the 19308.
If the role of government is to do less, then it follows that there is less need for a large civil
.service. As a result one would expect to see a reduction in the size of bureaucracies and
expect to see governments begin to apply the market test to their civil service. What can be
privatised? What can be commercialised?
One solution for government facing large deficits would be to simply downsize by reducing
staff. A "market' solution at least offers the civil service an opportunity to survive if they can
"make it in the market". The process of privatisation says that, if your services are of value to
the public and business in particular there will be a demand for these services. But if your
services are not in demand then you, like any product in "the product life cycle", will
disappear. In some ways it is a fair process. It is certainly better than government simply
deciding to layoff civil servants without giving them the opportunity to change their product
mix and develop a new rationale for existence and thus client base.
The issue of the role of government is more fully addressed in Section 6.0 where a perspective
is taken on what that role should be where reform has been generally adopted. The
perspective taken provides a basis to evaluate the implications of what has to date taken place
in New Zealand.
1.3 Objectives of the Study and Terms of Reference
The objective of the study is to investigate, evaluate and report on how the New Zealand
government obtains economic and policy analysis on the agricultureandagri-food sector and
how governmental reform has affected this activity.
The related questions that formed the details and thus focus of the study are contained in the
introductions to each of the sections of the report. They essentially form the specific terms of
reference, and thus guidelines for the specific issues and questions that were to be addressed.
1.4 Approach to Study
The approach taken in carrying out the study, the context under which the study was carried
out, the steps and procedures followed as well as contacts made are fully outlined in
Appendix A.
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SECTION 2
STRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF ECONOMIC
AND POLICY ANALYSIS IN GOVERNMENT
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to examine how the New Zealand government has been
restructured and reorganised to carry out its mandate. The focus is for the development and
delivery of economic and policy 'analysis.. The 'examination of how industry obtains its
economic and policy analysis both for its internal decision making, as well as its relationships
with government is contained in Section 3. This 'sectiorr'Specifically examines the following
questions and issues which relate to government:
• from what sources is economic and policy analysis for the agriculture and agri-food
sector obtained by the government (and other stakeholders)?
• what are the coordination and funding arrangements to obtain economic and policy
analysis?
• what are the various types of economic and policy analysis required by the government
and determine if the government sources specific types of information from specific
sources (i.e. internal vs external)?
• who are the key players on both the demand (i.e. government) and supply sides of this
process?
• how have the employment conditions of government employees who traditionally were
responsible for supplying economic and policy analysis, changed in the last 10 years?
2.2 Basis of Management Structure in the New Zealand Government
There are two pieces of legislation that have resulted in a major change in how the public
service is organised and operates. These are· the .. State Sector Act(1988) and the Public
Finance Act(1979). Together they have led to a radical departure from the previous ways in
which governments determined what they were going to produce, howthey were going to
produce it and what'it would cost. TheOffice of the ~Auditor General otCanada,ln its report
on New Zealand, Toward Better Governance: Public Sector Reform in New Zealand (1984-
94) and its Relevance to Canada provides a description of these two key pieces oflegislation.
The Auditor's report outlines the major provisions of the State Sector Act(1988) and explains
in particular the process in the appointment of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who
replaced the heads of Departments. It is important to understand the implications of replacing
tenured Heads with contract CEOs. One of the main effects of the reform was the loss of
guaranteed tenure of senior public servants. This point is discussed further in Section 5. It
has important implications for the delivery of economic and policy analysis. The approach
adopted stems from principal/agency theory and public choice theory. It places the Minister in
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the role as principal and CEO as agent. It requires the CEO to enter into an annual contract
for the delivery of services as outputs. The CEO in turn contracts with the staff of the
Department to deliver the outputs. In essence there can be a vertical tier of contracts and thus
performance agreements. The performance agreement forms the basis of the way in which the
CEO is held accountable to the Minister for the delivery of the outputs that were agreed upon.
The main elements of the Public Finance Act(1989) are outlined and discussed in the Auditor
General of Canada's Report. The main features are the following:
the replacement of the traditional input based system with the outcome-outputs based
system. It shifted the onus from input measurement (wages etc.) to output
measurement. It went further than the PPB system with its emphasis on outputs and
placed more emphasis on Jirst requiring the. identification of outcomes which are
"impacts on, or the consequences for, the community of the activities of Government".
The Report explains that it is -the Ministers ,and the ,·Cabinet collectively that are
responsible for defining the outcomes for which they will be held accountable to
Parliament and thus the electorate. It is here that New Zealand retains the traditions of
its parliamentary democratic system where the political party would develop its
platform for its agricultural policies. If elected it would be prepared to adopt its
political platform's policies and programs. The government in power can use other
means of determining its policies and programs, such as holding industry conferences,
receiving petitions from various interest groups or respond to internal needs.
• with this system Ministers purchase various outputs (including policy advice) from
their Department as well as from consultants. Outputs are identified as programs and
policies which a department can deliver in a specified period, to provide information to
facilitate actions etc. to achieve desired outcomes. The Auditor General of Canada's
Report makes the point that, the performance measures used to assess the quality of
policy advice and other outputs to the Minister, tend to be provided from within a
particular department. This issue is discussed at greater length in Section 5.
Note: It would be useful to review pages 36 to 47 of the Auditor General ofCanada's Report
in order to have a grasp of the various reforms that have resultedfrom the Act.
2.3 The Management System in Practice in the New Zealand Government
There are two documents that are key to understanding the current New Zealand system of
financial management reform which includes how it manages its bureaucracy in terms of what
it produces and how it evaluates the performance of what it produces. These are the Purchase
Agreement and the"Performanee'·A-greement."Ttlere--area'·nutrtber·C5fdocuments that outline
the procedures for the preparation of the Agreements, as well as an evaluation of the system.
The Treasury has prepared the following: Purchase Agreement Guidelines with Best Practices
for Output Performance Measures and Putting it Simply-An Explanatory Guide to Financial
Management Reform and The State Services Commission has prepared Chief Executive
Performance Agreement, Guidelines and Proforma 1995/96.
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Figure 2.1, Budget and Reporting, outlines the important steps which are followed in
producing the government's budget. In addition each department must prepare its corporate
plan, Purchase Agreement and Performance Agreement for agreement between the Minister
and the CEO. The figure indicates the cycle of reporting from the previous year, the current
year and budgeting for the following year. In describing the budget cycle the report "Putting it
Simply" explains in terms of policy advice that, "Before it can make Budget decisions, the
Government needs policy advice. As sellers of outputs, departments have an interest in the
policy advice they tender. The Government should seek advice from a number of different
sources: policy ministers, producers of outputs and private sector advisors. These people will:
• evaluate the relationship between outputs and outcomes
assist in determining which output is most likely,toproduce the desired outcomes
• recoli:iinend providers (and conditions and terms)
• recommend changes in output levels and mix
• evaluate the efficiency of departments.
Departments will continue to need people in a policy advice role to "market" their proposal to
Government. (p.31)
Although it closely follows Figure 2.1, the management cycle as it applies to MAF is shown in
Figure 2.2. This shows that the; Purchase and Performance agreements must be completed by
the July/August stage of the planning cycle. More will be said in Section 5 when the system is
evaluated.
2.4 MAF Organisation and Structure
Figure 2.3 sets out the MAF structure for 1994. At this time, there were 3 bureaus concerned
with policy advice - Agriculture Policy, Fisheries Policy and the Regulatory Authority.
Earlier, in 1991, Agricultural Research had been transferred to a Science Ministry. These
bureaus employed around 300 persons in 1994. In addition, MAF consisted of four other
bureaus, each specifically concerned with delivering inspection services, fisheries services,
corporate services and extension services.
Since 1994, fisheries policy and delivery have been separated off into a separate Ministry and
Agriculture New Zealand (the extension service) sold to the private sector. Inspection
services remain in the'"'fold'and~corporateservices1"eahsorbedarnong the remainiqg bureaus.
The 1996 position is therefore of a Ministry of two policy bureaus and one delivery bureau
confined to matters concerning the regulatory (both policy and delivery) and policy advice
formations of government. The agriculture staff in policy positions number around 100 with
another 100 support staff.
The Agriculture Policy bureau has remained relatively unchanged in staff numbers through this
reform process, of approximately 50 policy staff plus support staff The Group Directors are
supported by three Directorates (Administration, External and Domestic Policy) senior
analysts and graduate staff.
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2.5 Agriculture Policy Branch Resource Base
MAP Policy Group has 73 staff. The Group Director, is supported by five Directorates:
External, Domestic, Science, Agribusiness and Rural.
It was not easy to obtain the exact number of professionals working in Agriculture Policy and
their qualifications (e.g. most advanced degree). One of the Directors went down the
telephone list and by memory indicated which professionals had degrees at the Masters and
Ph.D. levels. Of the 56 on the list, eight had Masters Degrees, three had Ph.Ds, one of which
was in Sociology. It is not clear what degrees and/or other professional education and training
were held by the remaining staff. There was one lawyer, Larry Ferguson, who is the Group
Director of Agriculture Policy. .
2.6 Policy Advice Purchase Agreement for MAF, 1995/96
The Purchase Agreement is developed to produce the outputs which are seen as required to
achieve the outcomes as set out by the government. In its report Strategic Direction to the
Year 2000 MAP set out the following vision.
"For Agriculture, Horticulture and the Food Industries
• agriculture and horticulture sectors that are making maximum contribution to New
Zealand's economic, social and environmental well being.
• industries that are:
*
*
*
*
*
the most innovative, efficient and competitive in the world.
meeting the market for high-quality products from a high-quality environment.
based on sustainable practices.
expanding their contribution to New Zealand's GDP, export earnings and
employment levels.
profitable, robust and self-sufficient.
• Communities and industries that are managing their resources in partnership." (MAP,
February, 1995)
In order to understand how the New Zealand government organises economic and policy
advice in agriculture, it is important to first examine what economic and policy advice is being
sought. The best way to explain this is to examine the current Purchase Agreement. Table 2.1
outlines the budget for MAP with detail for policy advice and facilitation. The Table shows
that the budget for policy advice in MAP is $17.3 million for 1995/96. This can also be
broken down into operating budget available, $8.9 million; operational research $5.5 million;
and AGRIC NZ contracts, $3.1 million.
The description provided for the of output class 1: policy is, "This class of outputs provides a
range of policy advice and decision-support to the Minister and Government on the
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agricultural, horticultural and seafood sectors, the scope of the class covers production,
processing industry sector, rural communities, market outlook and market access negotiations
on technical barriers to trade. It also includes measures for facilitating understanding and
uptake of Government policy". (p.8).
The breakdown by output class in Table 2.1 indicate the descriptive categories of policy
outputs that are recognised. It shows that the focus is on trade, agribusiness and rural
resources. The specific descriptions for each output class for the policy area are contained in
Appendix B of this report. They are also available in the 1995/96 purchase agreement but are
reproduced here mostly for convenience for reference purposes. The terminology can be
interpreted as follows:
• Strategic Results Areas (SRAs), are a statement .of the. outcomes which are. heing
sought, and derive from a master strategic document administered by the Prime
Ministers Department.
• Key Results can be interpreted as the output that provides the basis for achieving the
specified SRAs or outcomes and is prepared by the CEO's office.
Milestones are specified work output highlights within more general work programs
and can be identified as papers, new legislation, policy proposals etc. prepared by staff
at all levels and approved by senior policy staff at the Director level (see Section 2.4).
Milestones in most cases represent probably less than 70 percent of the ongoing work of the
organisation-a large amount of which is concerned with maintenance operations, i.e.
maintaining trade access, maintaining databases, maintaining information sources, maintaining
capabilities to carry out analysis and policy advice functions, etc.
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Table 2.1
Summary of Outputs Purchased, 1995/96 Purchase Agreement for MAF
Revenue Revenue
Crown Other
($1000) ($1000)
Output Class 1 Policy Advice and Facilitation 17,339 60
1. 1 Trade Liberalisation 3,049
1.2 Agribusiness 4,826
1.3 Rural Resources 5,900
1.4 Climate and Other Adverse Effects 889
1.5 Science 997
1.6 Animal Welfare 906
1.7 Ministerial Servicing 870
Output Class 2 Management of Grants. Contracts and
Irrigation Schemes 305
Output Class 3 Administration of Agricultural Security,
Quality Assurance and Pest Management 6,488 6,305
Output Class 4 Animal Welfare Services 641
Output Class 5 Border Inspection and Quarantine Services
8,329 6,428
Output Class 6 Pest and Disease Surveillance Services
8,376
Output Class 7 Pest and Disease Emergency Response Services 8,511
Output Class 8 Control of Tuberculosis Vectors 14,282
TOTAL 64,271 12,938
Source: 1995/96 Purchase Agreement Between the Minister ofAgriculture and the Director-
General oj the Ministry ofAgriculture for the Year Ended 30 June 1996.
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Director: George Rogers
Figure 2.3
MAF Structure
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Director General.: Russ Ballard
DDG: Peter O'Hara;-wltIi--
special responsibility for
-- Government servicing
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SECTION 3
STRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF
ECONOMIC AND POLICYADVICE
IN INDUSTRY AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS
3.1 Introduction
".
The purpose of this section is to examine how economic and policy advice is organised and
delivered in some of the key agricultural industries in New Zealand. It was not possible to
examine all agriculture and food industries(llld"th~ ~p~citk finllsin.~ach of these industries. It
was decided, given the limited time available, to concentrate on New Zealand's three most
important agricultural industries; dairy, wool and meat
This section also includes a description of how economic and policy advice is delivered in
Federated Farmers Inc. as it is the prime farm lobby organisation in New Zealand and is thus
relevant for this study. A description of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration is
included as it provides a forum for the examination of the issues of the new management
system that has been adopted by the government
There is a discussion of the role of the academic community in the current delivery of
economic and policy analysis to government and industry.
Most of the questions that were provided as terms of reference for government, which were
outlined in the Introduction of Section 2 are relevant for industry. Those that are relevant are
repeated here for convenience:
•
•
•
•
•
from what sources is economic and policy analysis for the agriculture and agri-food
sector obtained by the government (and other stakeholders)?
what are the coordination and funding arrangements to obtain economic and policy
analysis?
what are the various types of economic and policy analysis required by the government
and determine if the government sources specific types of information from specific
sources (i.e_internaLv-s..external)2,
who are the key players on both the demand (i.e. government) and supply sides of this
process?
what are the relationships between the various agencies that supply information and
analysis to government (and ofher stakeholders)?
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3.2 Economic and Policy Analysis in Industry
It is important to understand to what degree firms and agencies in the key industries carry out
economic analysis and for what purposes. The following description and understanding is
based on three interviews. (See Appendix A for industries and individuals interviewed).
New Zealand Dairy Board
The Dairy Board is the marketing arm of the New Zealand dairy industry. The corporate
profile states that it is "an industry distinguished by its absence of subsidies and other
Government assistance, and the major contribution it makes to the natio~' s export earnings".
(New Zealand Dairy Board, Corporate Profile)
New Zealand supplies 25 percent of world trade in dairy products although it has only 1.5
percent of world milk production. Milk' production' was 732 million: kilograms of mild solids
in 1994/95. The group revenue was $5,019 million in 1994/95. Milk payout was 339 cents
per kilogram of milk solids in 1994/95 and is estimated to be 400 cents in 1995/96.
The Dairy Board consists of a network of 60 subsidiaries and associate companies throughout
the world. The Board markets all dairy products manufactured in New Zealand. Although the
government has granted the Board sole seller status the government plays no role in the day-
to-day affairs of the Board. The Dairy Board is fully' owned by and accountable to the dairy
industry. Policy direction is determined by the Board consisting of 13 directors, 11 elected by
the cooperative dairy companies and two appointed by government. Control therefore rests
with dairy farmers.
The Board reports to the industry through newsletters and publications to inform the
companies and farmers of the Board's business. Policies and Board performance are debated
at regular conferences.
The product divisions are supported by four other divisions: Services, Finance and Treasury,
External Policy and the Secretariat which includes the computer center.
The external policy division has six FTEs, five analysts and a secretary. The budget is
approximately $400,000 which is funded totally by the Board. The analysts are in pure
operating roles. Nigel Mitchell, who directs the external policy unit, made it emphatically
clear that the Board is not a policy organisation· meaning that it does little in the way of
interfacing with government over policy issues. The only exception would be trade policy
where it would make its view known to government on this issue. The main work of the
policy unit is to 'carrrouteconomic'analysisf6rthe''COmrrrerciafpolich:'$'Ofthe Board. .
The Dairy Board is doing more economic analysis than it was doing in 1984. This is related to
the fact that the Board is more autonomous than it was previously. The government no longer
"backstops" the Board. Mitchell said that the Board is more comfortable with the current
relationship with government. They see the role of government as setting standards and
ensuring that the standards are being met. This is critical for their international market. But
he feels that the delivery of the services to monitor quality should be made contestable.
Overall they see the main role of government to establish sound macro policy and to work
toward an international trading environment for New Zealand's interests. They are
comfortable that the key issues are being addressed by government. One concern is that in the
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policy area there is a danger that policy formulation could become too compartmentalised. He
sees that there is less interdepartmental communication in government largely as a result of the
purchase agreement system. He adds that purchase agreements work against cooperation
within government. The good things about the new system is that outputs are more timely and
there are less "turf fights" inside government.
Mitchell said that their industry does not request that government carry out any economic and
policy analysis for them. He said that they use MAF's Outlook Report but likely wouldn't buy
these services if they were not provided free. They periodically will have specialised studies
carried out by consultants. Two recent studies dealt with dairy cooperative payments and
cooperatives. He feels that there are no major gaps in information that are required by their
industry for its economic development.
On the question of "could economic and policy analysis be privatised for government in
general", the answer was "yes", economic analysis couldbeprivatised but "no", policy
analysis could not be. From the Dairy Board's perspective it needs its own dedicated unit for
internal policy analysis and also for those areas of policy where it interfaces with government.
New Zealand Wool Board
The Wool Board is a statutory body established under the Wool Industry Act of 1977. Its
charter is "to obtain, in the interests of New Zealand woolgrowers, the best possible long term
returns for New Zealand wool". The activities of the Wool Board are carried out under
Wools of New Zealand which is the operational arm of the Board. The vision of Wools of
New Zealand is: "to make New Zealand wool the most valued wool in the world. This will be
achieved by:
• encouraging and supporting growers to produce the wool the market wants,
• positively differentiating New Zealand wool from competing fibres, and
• anticipating and satisfying manufacturers' and consumers' needs." (Annual Report)
It is useful to report that the Wool Board completed a strategic planning process which
culminated in a clear vision for the industry and a set of targets by which the Board has invited
its stakeholders to judge its future performance. Each woolgrower has received a wall planner
outlining these targets.
The strategic planning process resulted in a changed strategy. The Board in 1994/95 reduced
its wool stocksamUully Gleared its"debts..tQ'coincide-witb.,.t;htH1ew,strategy... ,The· strategy calls
for the establishment of a number of selected manufacturing partners who are prepared to
meet the high New Zealand wool minimum requirements and have a strong presence in their
markets. Their target was to have 200 partners, which largely has been achieved.
This has been a change in strategy from "distant licensing" arrangements to that of
partnerships. Another component of the strategy is the establishment of a new brand, called
Fernmark.
The Wool Board has told government that it wishes to relinquish many of its statutory powers.
In reference to these changes the Annual Report states under Review of Legislation. "It is
frustrating that changes to the Wool Industry Act are taking so long to enact. We want to
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concentrate our energies, without distraction, upon research and development, technology
transfer, promotion of information and services which support the production of wool that
meets the needs of the market."
Research and development is recognised as important to the future of the New Zealand wool
industry. The Annual Report states that: "With government funding available in this area not
being sufficient, Wools of New Zealand research funding in 1994/95 was significantly
increased. On-farm research has been most severely hit by the changes in government
research funding." The Report indicates that the government is more sympathetic to providing
research monies to adding value, beyond the farm gate. The Wool Research Organisation of
New Zealand (WRONZ) is the research arm of the industry. Its budget has been increased
from $6.3 million in 1991/92 to $12.2 million in 1994/95. Wools of New Zealand invested
$4.3 million in applied research programs.. In addition about $6 million was directed at
technology transfer and commercialisation to take full advantage of their research expenditure.
To finance its operations the Wool Board collected $64.4 million in levies in 1994/95. The
basic levy is set at 6 percent of the value of the wool. The levy was spent as follows: product
marketing, 60 percent, research and development, 14 percent, fibre marketing, 5 percent,
grower services, 5 percent and corporate services and other, 16 percent.
In 1994/95 the industry produced 213 thousand tonnes ofwool from approximately 50 million
sheep. The wool sector earned $1.5 billion in export income in 1994/95. Wool fibre was 83
percent of this total, and 17 percent was wool products. China/Hong Kong is the main market
at 30 percent.
The Meat and Wool Board Economic Service provides economic and policy analysis for the
Wool and the Meat Boards. In addition to Mr R Davison as Director, there are three
economists and support staff. There are eight field staff who are engaged to survey sheep and
beef farms, to provide input into the forecasts that are prepared. They measure physical
production, financial records, income and expenditures. The budget for the unit is
approximately $1 million. The funding is all internal.
There has been no change to their core research program since 1984. Their forecasts are not
made public; they are for internal use. The forecasts are critical for planning purposes in
terms of processing, marketing transportation, etc. Their target is to be within 3 percent
accuracy on 18 month forecasts.
They do not use government economic and analytical services. They do not request any
economic analysis from government. The reason is the need for confidentiality. The Board
feels that it needs-a,dedioated·aFlalytical··seFVice-that.itweuld·not·'get'onarcontract basis with
government or other agency. The Board wants a unit that is "independent and authoritative".
They are willing, however, to sell their forecasts on a contract basis. They are consulted in the
preparation ofMAF's Outlook Report, which is an annual publication.
When asked about the current system providing information for informed policy debate, there
was the feeling that the government had a good track record on trade. On the issue of
resources, Mr Davison felt that there was a whole new learning process required and the
government in this area was struggling to find its proper role. He, however, offered no
specific advice on what he felt that role to be.
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There was some concern expressed that the government didn't know what it wants from
policy analysis in MAF. MAP was heading toward a dedicated policy unit. If it were
privatised it would possibly sort out what was really needed.
If there were gaps in information it was related to understanding markets and consumers
demands but this was seen as a private sector responsibility. Industries needed to do this on
their own.
New Zealand Meat Research and Development Council (MRDC)
The meat industry comprises a large area of investment in New Zealand. Investment is
estimated at $22.3 billion on sheep and beef farms and $2.2 billion in meat processing plants.
Employment is estimated at 37,00o.~onfarms and another 20,00.0 inmeatprocessing..._For the
year ending June 1995, output from the meat industry was $3.85 billion of which 88 percent
was export earnings. Meat made up 16 percent of-all New -Zealand exports. (R. Davison,
September 1995)
The MRDC is a subsidiary of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board. It is funded by meat
producers through the Board. Its goal is to improve the profitability of the New Zealand meat
and pastoral industry. It's mandate is to identify the most crucial areas for research and
development, communicating development to the meat industry, maximising and encouraging
research, ensuring accountability to research funders, and improving the overall effectiveness
and efficiency of research and development management. There is a farm levy of $ .47 per
lamb slaughtered.
The MRDC was born out of the restructuring in the meat industry that occurred with reform.
After the SMPs were abolished in 1984 farmers reassessed their situation. Sheep numbers fell
from about 70 million to 50 million. This put slaughter/processing plants in financial trouble.
The MRDC was established in 1990 mainly as a result of the problems in the industry.
It was stated that MRDC is run like a small development bank. It receives no grants. It does
compete and gets 30 percent of its funds outside the industry. It's current contestable funds
are at $8. 1 million.
At present the research pnonty areas are: disease, processing cost reduction, on-farm
productivity, decision support systems, market opportunities and fresh meat strategy. The
Board sees itself as a long term funder of research projects..Nearly 75 percent of the projects
will be funded for not less than three years. The priorities of the Council take account of the
strategic direction of the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. This is done to
align the priorities··ef4heGel:1floilwitfl..gev-ernment·4irooti0fl·topr-ovide-better·opportunity for
joint research venture funding between Council and Government.
MRDC does not have a research staff. Its operations are to facilitate research. It, therefore,
does no internal economic and policy analysis.. A review of the projects funded showed little
or no research focusing on economic and/or policy analysis.
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3.3 Economic and Policy Analysis in Other Organisations
Three organisations were singled out for review: Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc. and
the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration and the Agribusiness and Economic
Research Unit (AERU) ofLincoln University.
New Zealand Federated Farmers Inc.
The year .1995 marked the 50th anniversary of Federated Farmers. The membership currently
stands at 21,000, where farm numbers in New Zealand are approximately 80,000. Thirteen
other specialist producer groups are affiliated with Federated Farmers. It is also affiliated with
the International Federation of Agricultural Producers.. Federated Farmers is governed by its
Annual National Conference, a smaller National Council and·a National Executive which
meets on a regular basis. The national office is in Wellington. It provides policy development,
lobbying and legal services
The Mission of Federated Farmers is "to add value to the business of farming" and its Aims
are "to optimise the farming business operating environment, promote the enhancement of
rural infrastructure which meets the needs of the rural community, promote responsible farm
management and environmental practices and efficiently and effectively manage our business."
As stated, "Federated Farmers stands for an open, enterprise economy. We say this is best for
farmers and for the nation as a whole, to achieve employment growth and increased living
standards. Our vision is of a high productivity, high income, high employment, market
economy. This requires flexible markets of labour, goods and services, low inflation,
maximum sustainable resources-capital and people-and sustained investment in technology and
education." (Annual Report 1995)
The national office consists of 15 people of whom there are three who are full time policy
people, ofwhich two are economists. Their focus tends to be on all things that affect farmers
in terms of taxes, land issues, rural services (e.g. electricity, post offices, health, education)
transportation and others. The overall budget is approximately $3 million of which $300,000
is for economic and policy related work. They are doing more economic analysis than in 1984
but less than three to four years ago.
The future roles for government are seen to be to continue with reform to other sectors of the
economy and to provide direction and leadership in resolving the issue of producer marketing
boards. It was not clear where Federated Farmers stand on the issue of marketing boards.
The main issues for economic and policy analysis were felt to be inflation and money supply
regulation, tax reform, local government reform, and privatisation. of certain sectors such as
ports. They· encourage-government"to"continuei;'support"Of,the 'C3RIs and thus scientific
research.
Federated Farmers don't request economic and policy analysis from MAF. On occasion they
will make a recommendation that a certain problem be looked at however.
It was not foreseen that economic and policy analysis would be privatised in the government;
he felt that government needed a dedicated policy analytical unit. Federated Farmers supports
the principle of privatisation but not when it comes to economic and policy analysis in
government.
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New Zealand Institute ofPublic Administration (NZIPA) and Dr Royce Elliott
"The NZIPA is a voluntary, non-profit organisation committed to promoting informed debate
on issues already significant in the way New Zealanders govern themselves, or which are
emerging as issues calling for decisions on what sorts of laws and management New
Zealanders are prepared to accept." (Public Sector, Vol. 18, No 2, June 1995) It arranges
seminars and workshops for people to debate issues. Its membership includes a wide range of
professional managers, advisors and teachers in the public sector. It publishes Public Sector
which is a quarterly journal of research, reviews, and reports from seminars and debates.
One of the main reasons for visiting the NZIPA was to talk to its current Executive Director,
Dr Royce Elliott. Dr Elliott spent most of his career in.MAF. His Ph.D. is in veterinary
science but he developed additional training in systems.managemenL He.was Acting Director
General when the new contracts program was introduced in government. He was in private
practice for six years, then in Agricultural. ResearchinMAF, then Director of the Dairy
Division ofMAF.
He commented on a number of the changes that have taken place in MAF. One of the key
changes was the reduction in the number of divisions. He felt that this was useful but the
structural changes have gone too far. MAF has lost its research area, with government
research now in the Ministry of Science. He said that the government tried to turn MAF
Quality into a Crown enterprise. This was not acceptable to New Zealand's trading partners.
The concern was over "capture" by the private sector--so the government backed off. It
appears that other governments wanted the 'government' guarantee retained absolutely.
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada was probably consulted.).
There are certainly alternative views on some of these issues. Some would argue that for a
country the size of New Zealand, and where coordination is essential, research should be
contained largely in one Ministry. This is what was done, and MAF lost direct control over its
own research agenda. In the same vein some would question whether there is capture by the
private sector, in this case, regulation of food quality. It is the opinion of the author that the
regulation of quality has public good elements and thus requires effective third party
intervention. The other issue is whether countries use quality and regulation as a protectionist
instrument and further whether professional practices can be relied upon to arrive at a fair and
equitable assessment of regulations in this area. It is a most difficult issue. It deserves more
attention than it has probably been given.
One of his most significant points was that there never was a serious consideration to privatise
the role of policy development in MAF. This point was corroborated as well by several of the
current MAF offiGials,who·wefe·interviewed~ .The ,prefer-oo.ce ·was·to<-have· a .strong discipline
base inside the Department.
The Academic Community
There are two major agricultural universities in New Zealand, Massey University located at
Palmerston North in the north island and Lincoln University located near Christchurch in the
south island. Both universities have departments that specialise in the broader economics
discipline as it relates to the agricultural and food sectors. For the purpose of this paper the
focus will be on Lincoln University and in particular the Agribusiness and Economics Research
Unit (AERU). The AERU is connected to the Economics and Marketing Department
although it is administered and funded separately. It provides an example of a research unit
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that was established initially mainly for the purpose of carrying out economic analysis for the
agricultural sector.
The AERU was originally founded as the Agricultural Economics Research Unit in 1962. It
was supported by an annual grant provided by the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research(DSIR). DSIR provided $100,000 per year which was matched by then Lincoln
College. DSIR funding was discontinued in 1986 but Lincoln University has continued to
provide $100,000. In recognition of the AERU's wider research activity in the agribusiness
sector its name was changed in 1987.
"The AERU operates as a semi-commercial research agency. Research contracts are carried
out for clients on a commercial basis, and University research is supported. by the AERU
through sponsorship of post,- graduate _research: programs, Research clients include
Government Departments, both within New Zealand and from other countries, international
agencies, New Zealand companies and.organisations, individuals and farmers. Research
results are presented through private client reports, where this is required and through the
publication system operated by the AERU Two publication series are supported: Research
Reports and Discussion Papers." (AERU Pamphlet)
"The major research areas supported by the AERU include trade policy, marketing (both
institutional and consumer), accounting, finance, management, agricultural economics and
rural sociology. In addition to the research activities, the AERU supports conferences and
seminars on topical issues and AERU staff are involved in a wide range of professional and
College related extension activities." (AERU Pamphlet)
Although the above statements represent what the AERU is capable and willing to undertake,
and in some respects what it has done in the past, it does not accurately reflect its current level
and range of activities.
The current Director of the AERU is Professor A(Tony) Zwart. The current staff consists of
a full time secretary, and approximately 1.7 full time researchers in addition to the Director.
Policy direction for the AERU is provided by a Review Committee which meets as required,
an AERU Management Committee comprised of the Vice Chancellor, the Professors of the
three associated departments. This means that over 50 professionals are available to carry out
research etc. through the AERU
In 1995 the AERU completed eight projects with a t-otal budgetof $130,000, submitted 27
proposals with a budget total of $417,000, and had 11 proposals accepted with a budget value
of$134,000. There were in addition nine proposals pending with a total budget of$60.000.
The AERU had the following number of publications: four research reports/discussion papers,
seven client reports, two journal articles, six journal articles submitted, one conference paper,
four seminars, four review, and two other reports. The AERU also published eight discussion
papers of Department of Economics and Marketing staff. The AERU collaborated on nine
projects within Lincoln University and with five outside organisations plus four graduate
students supervised.
Professor Zwart indicated that the AERU probably reached its peak in terms of professional
staff and output in 1982. At that time it had a staff of 20 professionals. Research consisted of
large contracts with government in particular MAF. It carried out an annual Town Milk
Survey and an Arable Industry Survey. Work for the Wheat Board was lost when the Wheat
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Board was discontinued. Then when the government discontinued agricultural subsidies and
most of its direct involvement in the agricultural sector in 1984, research work for MAP
declined even further. There is less economic and policy analysis work being carried out as
there are less policy issues on the public agenda.
Professor Zwart sees the need and opportunity for the establishment of a larger business
liaison group within the commerce area ofLincoln University. In brief this unit would have as
its objectives to formalise the linkages between the University and the New Zealand business
community, to increase the opportunities for Lincoln Commerce students to be involved in the
business community and increase their opportunities for employment, to assist faculty in
increasing their research involvement with the business community and to provide outside
organisations the means of benefiting from the expertise of the University.
This proposal was initiated in September 1994 but to date the University has not acted on it.
One of the problems would seem to be the level of demand from the business community for
research and broader involvement in educational programs. It would seem that there is a need
for a survey of the business community which has not been carried out. Thus it remains
uncertain what the future is for the academic communities involvement with business and thus
industry in New Zealand. But in terms of involvement with the MAP the demand for
economic and policy remains limited. The relationship between the MAP and the academic
community could be strengthened in several ways. Grant McFadden of MAP referred to a
proposal that would see MAP fund and place an economist with each of the major economic
departments of the key universities. To date this too has not been acted upon.
3.4 Summary
The marketing boards support physical research in their respective areas but are not directly
involved in governmental policy advice or research. They are consulted frequently on
government policy issues. Their powers only exist at the discretion of the government.
Federated Farmers deal directly with both political representatives and bureaucrats. They are
consulted frequently. They are good at making their views known to government.
Evidence suggests that there is limited research being carried out on economic analysis and
even less policy analysis being carried out for government in economic departments in New
Zealand universities. This conclusion however is largely based on the current situation at
Lincoln University. People here are not aware of any major activities at Massey University in
economic and policy analysis for government.
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SECTION 4
THE EVOLUTION OF REFORMAND ITS IMPACTS
4.1 Introduction
This section focuses on questions that relate to the development and delivery of economic and
policy analysis in government and industry. It specifically attempts to answer the following
questions: ,.,"
• to what extend does the current structure in agriculture represent long established
institutional development and arrangements?
• how much has the relationship been modified/affected by reforms since the mid-1980s?
• how has the relationship between academic/publicly funded research
centres/government departments altered over the last 10 years?
• is the system still evolving, in what direction does it appear to be heading (i.e. more or
less commercialisation)
One of the key issues is how far should reform go? What in other words is the new
equilibrium? What is optimum in terms of the quantity and quality of government
intervention in the economy, in agriculture and food? What is the quantity and quality of
professional staff (private consultants and academics) required to guide the state and the
private sector in terms of economic and policy analysis? How and who decides when
downsizing has gone far enough? Is it true that more laissez-faire is always better? What
paradigm will provide the basis to answer these questions. And what analysis is
required?
It is not obvious at the present that there is in place the paradigm and model to decide, But it
is interesting that' there .' does" hot appear to'be 'nllich" evidence thal' any; o'neis willing to take
anyone seriously who even asks these questions. But one can find in the literature at least the
skeptics and importantly scholars who are providing the theoretical base to provide the
analysis for evaluating reform and the process of reform. It is not clear whether they can be
found inside the bureaucracy. New Zealand appears to be basking in the "glory" of the
attention that it is receiving for its "reforms" and does not want to admit that it needs to be
cautious in taking reform to an extreme, that in the extreme too little government may be a
bad thing. On this point the recent book by Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment, A
World Model for Structural Adjustment, 1995 which is questioning the degree of reform has
not found a receptive audience. Others such as Boston, Martin and Walsh are providing a
more cautious questioning ofwhat has been adopted as reforms.
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4.2 The Beginnings of Reform and Critique of the Reform Process
In order to evaluate how the "reform" process has affected the agricultural sector and thus be
able to evaluate its degree of success it is important to understand the origins of thinking that
took place both prior to 1984 and subsequently. This is quite well summarised by the Auditor
General of Canada's report, pages 17 to 28. However, for anyone who wishes to fully
understand the reform process from inception to the present and be able to draw one's own
conclusions about what it has accomplished it is imperative that one reads something more
than someone else's brief and summary. With that said, the following attempts to provide that
summary but also a guide for additional reading.
As the Auditor General of Canada's report correctly explains, there had been prior to 1984
(when the reform process was launched by·thenewbabour Government) a concern inside the
New Zealand bureaucracy about the lack of effective management and accountability of the
country's state of affairs. This concern perhaps surfaced in New Zealand and culminated in
reforms here fJ.rst, at least first to the degree that changes were made, because of the dominant
role of the state in the economic and social life of the nation. It was probably also influenced
by the degree to which New Zealand's standard of living had fallen. It thus may have been
obvious in New Zealand first relative to other countries that there was a direct correlation
between state intervention and lack of economic growth. It will be interesting to examine the
results of the recent study Economic Freedom of the World 1975-1995 by James Gwartney
and Roger Block (see The Economist, January 13 to 19, 1996). It reports that New Zealand
now ranks third in the Index of Economic Freedom out of 102 countries studied. The related
question is how well is the New Zealand economy doing as a result of the extensive reforms
that have taken place?
What gave rise to reform? Boston explains that many forces converged that resulted in this
"remarkable wave of reform". These included fiscal imperatives, the general ideological shift
to the right and thus the enthusiasm for privatisation and commercialisation, and the quest for
accountability for the bureaucracy and political executive. "The documentary evidence shows
that the departmental officials in guiding the reform programme, particularly those in the
Treasury (1984, 1987), based much of their advice concerning the public sector on an
analytical framework grounded in public choice theory, managerialism and the new economics
of organisation, most notably agency theory and transaction-cost analysis". (Boston, J. et aI.,
p.2 and 3). It is his viewpoint that while public choice theory and managerialism had been
used in other countries as the basis of certain reforms what was unique to the New Zealand
reform paradigm was the addition of the new institutional economics, including the new
economics of organisations.
One of the questions that needs to be answered is, what was the degree of intellectual
effort that developed the paradigm that established the process of reform that New
Zealand has followed? Has the reform model and process that has been applied built into
it the seeds of its own destruction and further the inability to maintain the reform? It is
important at this point to raise the question about intellectual capacity inside government
to decide when to stop the evolution of reform. To the extent that the paradigm has built
into it cost saving at the government level how does this affect the quality of professional
resources and thus human capital in the bureaucracy? It is one of the hypotheses of this
paper, that the government has implicitly in applying the market concept in terms of the
outcome/output system introduced the means of reducing the quality of professional staff
thus affecting the ability to effectively manage the process of reform.
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The purchase system requires that there is an ultimate consumer of product, and this is the
Minister and Cabinet. This creates a set of demands for outputs in order to achieve certain
outcomes that are supposedly established in a quasi political market. But in a market sense
these are nothing more than the outcomes that the government must "sell" to the public
through a political process. The ultimate test is the electorate as consumer. The problem of
applying the perfect market paradigm here is the question of information and the ability of the
consumer to judge quality. In the case of the agricultural sector the consumers of policy
results are farmers and agricultural businesses as producers of food and fibre and consumers of
food products.
What follows from the hypotheses of the inability of the public and Minister to judge
quality is that the market settles on producing art· inferior product. The market model
applied here will under invest in the bureaucracy. By doing so it does not provide for the
quality of intellectual capacity that generated the ideas that produced the reform in the
first place. How do we test this hypothesis? We could assume that there is a direct
correlation between the number of Ph.Ds in government (e.g. Treasury) and the ability to
generate the managerial model for monitoring the system and adjusting the paradigm as
time goes on. It is a question ofknowing where the equilibrium is in terms of downswing.
It is a question of knowing what the appropriate roles and responsibilities of government
are. If correct one of the insidious consequences of the paradigm that the intellectuals
established is that the model does not have components to maintain the intellectual
capacity that created it. This is why I suggest that the reform process may have built into
itself the seeds of its own destruction. What forces are in place to prevent this from
occurring? This is not clear.
The conclusion that Boston et al. arrive at from public choice theory in the context of self
interested rent seeking is that the influence of pressure groups will expand. While maybe okay
in the economic market place it is likely to lead to damaging results in the political market
place. The rent seeking behaviour of constituents and the attempt by politicians to satisfy their
demands will result in ever increasing budgets and thus soak up an ever increasing quantity of
resources. Boston et al. state: "As a result, the state will grow well beyond what is necessary
to guarantee national security, maintain law and order and satisfy voter preferences.
Individual liberty will be undermined. Economic growth will be disrupted. And powerful
interest groups will capture a disproportionate share ofnational income." (p.3)
The policy conclusion from this school of thought is to constrain the power of politicians,
making it more difficultf.of.them.to;run.defioits<ifHooessary.,oPFaising;,taxesi beyond a certain
level. As Treasury argued (Treasury, 1987, pp.75-76) bureaucrats have a vested interest in
their own survival; they should not both advise their Ministers and implement policy at the
same time. It is for this reason that the Treasury argued for a broad spectrum for policy
advice and for making services provided by the state, including policy advice, contestable,
even though this was not followed up later.
The basis of agency theory is to see the world as one in which there is explicit or implicit
contracting that takes place where a principal enters into a contract with an agent for the
provision of some good or service. Agency theory directs the attention to the negotiation of
these contracts and the ways in which there are forms of contract failure. Much depends on
how well the contract is negotiated and the conditions under which this takes place. It is more
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likely that contract failure will occur if the conditions for negotiating the contract between
principal and agent are competitive (self interest seeking) rather than cooperative. The
principal/agent perspective resulted in the focus on the need to establish an explicit contracting
system so that the Minister as principal could effectively and efficiently contract with his agent
the Chief Executive for services. It resulted in the State Sector Act (1988) and its system of
contracting for services.
Coase argued that economics should be studied from the perspective of how transactions are
carried out, and why firms will decide to carry out production inside the firm rather than rely
on the market. As Boston et al. point out, in transaction cost analysis, five major concepts
dominate, "uncertainty, small-numbers bargaining, asset specificity, bounded rationality and
opportunism".(p.7) Transaction cost analysis is thus a concept that influenced the thinking
about how government services should be provided internally or by contract outside of the
Department, that is, in the market.
The last ingredient that influenced the thinking behind the reforms, at least in terms of the
reform of the bureaucracy, was managerialism. I feel that it is useful here to report the
summarisation that Boston et al. make for New Public Management (NPM). "The central
features of (or doctrines) of the NPM can be summarised as follows:
(a) an emphasis on management rather than on policy, in particular, stresses management
skills in preference to technical or professional skills;
(b) a shift from the use of input controls and bureaucratic procedures and rules to a
reliance on quantifiable output measures and performance targets;
(c) the devolution of management control coupled with the development of new reporting,
monitoring and accountability mechanisms;
(d) the desegregation of large bureaucratic structures into quasi-autonomous agencies, in
particular the separation of commercial from non-commercial functions and policy
advice from policy implementation;
(e) a preference for private ownership, contracting out, and contestability in public service
provision;
(f) the imitation of certain private sector management services such as the use of short-
term labour contracts, the development of corporate plans, performance agreements
and mission statements, the introduction of performance-linked remuneration systems,
the development~'Of'new'management';nformation-systenl's,''arrdagrcater concern for
corporate image;
(g) a general preference for monetary incentives rather than non -monetary incentives,
such as ethics, ethos, and status; and
(h) a stress on cost-cutting, efficiency, and cutback management." (p.9 and 10)
Boston et al. provide anecdotal evidence for how the various theories have been manifested in
the new legislation and changes in how government is managed. Public choice theory has led
to an emphasis on transparency, the move to decouple policy advice and policy
implementation, and large political staffs in the central administration of government to give
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Ministers alternative sources of policy advice. Agency theory would have had a bearing on
corporatisation and privatisation and influenced the provisions of the State Sector Act in terms
of employment contracts for senior public servants and the relationship between Ministers and
departmental chief executives. Transaction cost analysis probably gave impetus to the
tendency to the formal use of contracts. Managerialism according to Boston et aI., has given
emphasis to management skills and training in the public sector, making departments more
responsive to their customers and other related management issues.
After providing an explanation of how the new political and economic theories influenced the
development of the package of reforms, Boston et aI. point out the weaknesses of each of
these theories. Space does not allow a discussion of these weaknesses and limitations of these
theories in terms of their application to reform. What is important is the implications of these
weaknesses for the eventual performance ofthe reforms themselves.One.interesting.question
that was discussed previously is whether the system that put the new reformed system in place
(State Sector Act, Public Finance Act,'etc,) ~'hastheintelleGtual capacity to monitor and
evaluate it. What the final verdict will be on New Zealand's reform is open to speculation. It
is an issue that should not be taken lightly.
Anyone contemplating adopting the New Zealand model would be wise to be cautious
and to fully understand the product that is under consideration for adoption and its
relevance in a new and different setting. In his conclusions on the influence of the four
theories Boston provides a note of caution about too quickly adopting a new line of inquiry or
conceptual framework and forgetting the strengths of earlier political philosophies,
administrative traditions and organisational theories which were shaped by culture and history.
It is a warning against continually re-inventing the wheel and repeating the mistakes of the
past. This short report cannot do justice to this point but for outsiders who take short term
pilgrimages to New Zealand to find nirvana in terms of the model for reform they should begin
to pay attention to the scholars who are beginning to question and analyse the new paradigm
of reform.
4.3 The Reforms as Applied to Agriculture
Here there is a reliance on a number of sources. One of the most comprehensive accounts of
the application of reform to the agricultural sector is: Ron Sandrey and Russell Reynolds,
editors, Farming Without Subsidies, New Zealand's Experience. This publication was a MAP
Policy Services Project and obviously sponsored by MAP to tell the story of how changes lead
to reform program, "to document the major reforms that were carried out from 1984 to late
1989, to assess the consequences for these reforms for the agricultural sector and to discuss
key issues facing new policy makers."(p.l). It was in large part sponsored to add support to
the Cairns GrouppositibfiattheUroguayRourtdfoT"freer lfa:d'e, .. reduced .. protection and
subsidies for agriculture world wide. This point is stressed in the Foreword by the Director-
General of MAP, Dr Russell Ballard. "New Zealand's position in advocating substantial
reform of international agricultural trade rules in the current Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiation is consistent with its domestic action as described in their book. Farming Without
Subsidies will contribute to furthering New Zealand's international objectives" ( Foreword).
It is interesting to note that the ERS, of the USDA provided financial support for the project.
It is not possible given the scope of this paper to examine the structure of New Zealand's
agriculture and the impact that reform has had on it. It is important, however, to briefly
review the reforms that were carried out and the implications that this has had for MAP and in
particular economic and policy analysis.
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4.3.1 The Agricultural Sector in New Zealand
The value of agricultural output in New Zealand is estimated at $10.1 billion NZ for 1995.
This is up sharply from the mid 1980s where gross output was $7.2 billion. It was $9.3 billion
in 1990. By subtracting intermediate consumption the estimated contribution to GDP is $5.0
billion NZ. Total NZ GDP is estimated at $87.9 billion for 1995. In 1990 the contribution of
agricultural production to GDP was $4.6 billion and $3.0 billion in 1985.
This means that agriculture's current contribution to national GDP is 5.7 percent. This has
held very steady since about the mid 1980s. It was 13.9 percent in 1966, 10.1 percent in
1971, 9.2 percent in 1976, 9.4 percent in 1981 and 7.7 percent in 1985. This underestimates
the total effect that the agricultural sector has on the economy. When value added in terms of
processing, transport, input supply and whGlesale/retail are taken into account the total
contribution to GDP in 1995 is estimated to be $12.1 billion, or 15 percent of GDP(SONZA)
The composition of gross agriculture production is largely made up for production from
pastoral agriculture, although vegetables and fruits have increased over time while cattle,
sheep and lambs have declined. Much of course depends on the cyclical nature of prices.
Table 4.1 provides some indication of changes in product composition form 1973 onwards.
It is with trade that agriculture makes a much larger contribution to the New Zealand
economy. Agriculture contributed between 80 to 90 percent of exports in the mid 1960s and
now contributes about 60 percent. It was partly the vulnerability of the economy because of
its reliance on agriculture as well as the experience of the 1930s depression which resulted in
New Zealand adopting a policy to expand the manufacturing sector and thus create
employment. It consequently adopted a program of protection based largely on quantitative
controls rather than tariffs. Rayner in Farming Without Subsidies points out that New
Zealanders associate the policy of protection with low unemployment and it is for this reason
that it was difficult to adopt a policy of free trade. The problem for the agricultural sector was
that the import replacement policy resulted in higher prices of importables and thus became a
tax on sectors like agriculture. In other words New Zealand farmers were forced to pay
higher than world prices for farm machinery and inputs like chemicals and fertilisers.
New Zealand's agriculture thrived on the back of the Korean War and its commonwealth
privileges with, in particular the United Kingdom market. This advantage disappeared upon
the entry of the UK into the EC in 1973. In addition the increasing subsidisation of agriculture
in the EC under the CAP and increasing agricultural productivity led to a worsening in the
terms of trade facing agricultural sectors in New Zealand as it did in Canada. It is interesting
to note, however, that while it was the dairy sector that was one of the sectors hardest hit in
New Zealand becausewef., its·hrelianee· em ·4heexp0rt'''mafM:~t;,·the; s:ame"lndustry in Canada
protected through supply management and with price based cost of production, remained
profitable.
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Table 4.1
Composition of Agricultural Production
1973 1985 1990 1995
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Wool 22.7 16.0 13.4 10.5
Sheep and lambs 16.8 10.4 9.3 11.2
Cattle 17.4 14.0 12.8 13.3
Dairy products 21.0 19.2 23.3 24.3
Fruit & other horticulture 2.5 7.3 8.5 8.2
Vegetables 2.7 3.1 4.4 4.7
Sub total 83.1 70.0 71.7 72.2
Other 16.9 30.0 28.3 27.8
Source: Farming Without Subsidies andSONZA;'j<J95
In addition, the policy of maintaining an over valued exchange rate on balance penalised
agriculture. As Rayner points out, the government recognised the impact that its micro and
macro policies were having on the agricultural sector and bowed to the demands of the
agricultural sector demands for compensation. However, it was not until the 1960s as Rayner
reports in Farming Without Subsidies, that there were significant subsidies at the farm level,
"from then until 1984 there was a gradual acceleration in production grants and subsidies:
taxation schemes included incentives for land development and concessionary livestock
valuation schemes; the various forms of fertiliser subsidies continued to increase in size; and
loans at below market interest rates became increasingly valuable as market rates increased".
(p. 17) It is his analysis that the government was willing to continue on with increased
subsidies which were treating the symptoms rather than dealing with the causes, or facing up
to the realities of the international market. As terms of trade continued to worsen the
government attempted to compensate farmers by raising the level of support to offset the
decline in net returns. In effect the policy was one of sheltering the pastoral industries from
the reality of the overseas market as well as maintaining a protected manufacturing sector.
Rayner argues that this policy thus slowed the process for needed diversification. (Canada
took the same approach with the special payments to the grain economy as an offset to the
effect of the US export subsidy programs).
A number of schemes were aimed at stabilising and increasing production. Rayner says: "The
livestock Incentive Scheme of 1976 was designed to boost stock numbers at a time when they
were, appropriately, falling. Land Development Encouragement loans were likewise aimed to
increase producti"on;"particnlarly'Ort'"tllarginalland':"'·(p:19). "No!'''ali'wbutd agree that the
policies to stabilise and expand production were flawed. Increased production meant
increased exports which would improve trade balances. It would depend of course on
whether the increased production was of net benefit to the country. There were programs put
in place to expand exports such as tax incentive schemes based on export growth. Rayner
stated that: "The full set of policies was essentially in place following the introduction of the
Supplementary Minimum Price (SMP) scheme, first introduced in 1978." (p.18). The problem
was that the compensation to agriculture was still not sufficient to offset the cost to
agriculture from the protection of the manufacturing sector. Rayner argues that New Zealand
would have been better off if protection had been eliminated along with the compensation.
The added problem was that the compensation was not balanced. It favoured sheep meat and
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thus acted as a disincentive for farmers to diversify. The forms and estimated levels of
assistance to pastoral agriculture are shown in Table 4.2
Table 4.2
Forms and Level of Assistance to Pastoral Agriculture
($ million)
1970 1980-84 1985-90 1995
Assistance on output -13 271 104 4
Assistance on inputs 9 73 28 2
Assistance on VA. factors 27 429 550 100
Total gross assistance 23 773 681 106
Less excess costs imposed on
pastoral agriculture na -359 335 139
Net assistance to pastoral na 414 346 -33
agriculture
Effective rate of assistance na 41% 20% -1%
Source: Farming Without Subsidies and SONZA, 1995
The averages in Table 4.2 mask the level of subsidisation that was reached. The maximum
level of subsidisation was reached in 1983 where total assistance was $1,093 million. In that
year the SMPs were $438 million. The ERA in 1983 was 123% and the Producer Subsidy
Equivalent was 34%. By 1990 the total level of assistance to pastoral agriculture had been
reduced to $206 million and the ERA stood at -6%, as the manufacturing sector protection
had not been removed to the extent that support had been removed from agriculture.
The levels of assistance that were reached on lamb and kiwifruit attracted the attention of the
US and resulted in countervailing duties. But the main problem was the contribution that the
supports to agriculture were contributing to the fiscal deficit. Following the Labour election
the SMPs were removed in June 1984.
It is important to understand the shift that took place in agricultural thinking and hence policy.
Rayner states that: "It is difficult to separate the growing realisation that reform of
agricultural policies was needed from the movement towards general economic reform."
(p.19). The impacts of New Zealand's protectionist policy were originally masked by the
commodity boom of the early 1950s. When the boom ended New Zealand's economic
problems began to be slowly exposed. "There was no immediate crisis, but rather a gradual
accumulation of pieees'of'evidence"ihat~the"economy-was 'not 1Jerf6rtningaswell as dlhetsin
the world nor sufficiently well to meet peoples' aspiration." The evidence was a decline in
New Zealand's level of national income per capita in comparison to otherOECD countries.
Through the 1970s and 1980s the economic indicators began to worsen; inflation increased,
unemployment rose, and overseas debt increased from about zero in 1973 to about 50 percent
of GDP by 1984. It was becoming obvious to politicians and the public that unless fiscal
deficits were brought under control and the debt reduced, the cost of servicing the debt was
going to have a detrimental effect on the economy.
Given that the source of many of New Zealand's problems were rooted in the protectionist
policies abroad which New Zealand had little hope of directly influencing, it left New Zealand
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to direct its attention to increasing the efficiency of the domestic economy, inefficiencies that
were fostered by years of the various forms of intervention and thus protection. The
alternative was to reduce the protection and seek ways to increase efficiency. The
interventionist "Think Big" policies of government were replaced by the policy to rely on free
market forces. Rayner explains that this did not all happen in 1984, as plans were being drawn
up and implemented as early as 1979 to assist, or force, domestic industries to adjust to
foreign competition. This included the signing of a free trade agreement with Australia.
Farming Without Subsidies has provided a chronology of stabilisation and liberalisation
measures in New Zealand for the 1978-89 period. They are contained in Appendix C of this
report.
4.3.2 Recent Agricultural Policy Issues
Another source of a review and analysis ofNew Zealand agriculture to 1993 is R. W. M.
Johnson, New Zealand Agricultural Policy Review: 1991-93. Johnson makes it clear that the
focus of the government strategy from 1984 on, and hence policy, was to manage the macro
side largely through tight monetary and fiscal policies and leave it to market forces to direct
the allocation of resources at the micro level. He states that: "The philosophic paradigms of
the day are centred on the free operation of markets. with minor interference by Governments
in day-to-day management or ownership of enterprises. As a result the agricultural sector has
to find its appropriate role in the new policy framework by learning by experience and
experimentation. The biggest lesson to learn is that government still retains control over the
important macro-parameters such as monetary policy, fiscal policy and the exchange rate. The
settings of these policy parameters determine the conditions for the conduct of ordinary
commerce and trade. The agricultural sector in New Zealand is no exception to this, whatever
it was in the past." (p.381).
Johnson provides a review of the agricultural policy agenda in the 1991 -93 period. This will
add to and thus complement the chronology of policy changes appearing in Appendix C. The
following is a listing of developments in this period.
• The establishment of ten Crown Research Institutes (CRIs), thus making a major
change in the organisation of agricultural public sectoral research. In the 1992 Budget
$255 million was voted for science which would be available on bid to Universities and
other research agencies. This took the largest part of the research allocation for
agricultural research out of the Ministry of Agriculture budget.
• As of 1993 the government had decided not to proceed with the privatisation of the
extension."s~l¥ice,:·· A, cJa.ange<in, p@licy"had,.Qccurred.wherecin···}uly. of 1992 the
extension service was reorganised as Agriculture New Zealand to operate as a profit
centre within the Ministry. Subsequent to Johnson's review, Agriculture New Zealand
has been privatised, being sold to Wrightson's, a commercial trading firm.
• Electricity reform has meant that the rural subsidy on electricity will likely disappear.
• Introduction and implementation of the Employments Contracts Act in 1991. The Act
introduces greater flexibility into labour relations by providing employers and
employees with more freedom of choice in negotiating their terms and conditions of
employment. An analysis by Ellis indicates that at the farm level individual contracts
are almost universal and that union membership has almost disappeared. In the meat
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industry union membership has fallen and union/plant agreements have been replaced
with plant specific agreements, although not in the dairy processing industry.
Waterfront reform. There has been a reduction in manpower at the waterfronts which
has led to increased productivity and reduced costs.
The Resource Management Act was passed in June 1991. It is designed to promote
the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. It will have a major
impact on how decisions are made for resource use. Regional and district councils will
administer the Act.
Land rights and Maori, land claims. New Zealand has its own version of native land
claims, stemming from the Treaty ofWaitangi of 1840. It gave the Crown the sole
right to purchase land from the Maoris and promised Maoris rights to land would be
honoured. There has been a long running attempt {D"Sort out claims and rights and it
has had an effect on land and hence agricultural policy. The issue is far from being
resolved.
Review of producer marketing board legislation has been a major area of policy review
in an attempt to reform the marketing board role in industry. An extensive report on
producer marketing boards, was carried by ACIL which is an Australian consulting
firm. The study was done for the New Zealand Business Roundtable. In the preface
to the final report the Business Roundtable stated that the study was commissioned,
"to ascertain whether there is anything special about agricultural products which
continues to justify the present extent of intervention. Why is it that deregulation and
privatisation, which have worked so well in other areas of the economy both here and
overseas, are not considered appropriate for agricultural products?" (p. Preface).
Johnson indicates that the ACIL report has received some criticism in being too
preoccupied with structure-conduct-performance and for not having enough
understanding of the role of marketing boards in reaching end markets.
There were two changes in legislation which occurred in the period of Johnson's
review. These included:
* The passage of the Dairy Board Amendment Act in 1992. A number of major
changes were made in the way that the government interfaces with the dairy industry.
Johnson states that, "The aim of the legislation is to make the Board more independent
of government and more accountable to the industry". (p.385) The Act places the
government in the role of watchdog as it stipulates that there be five yearly
performance"and""effIcienoy"audits'. ····~:rl1e,A'0t,stipulated,,4Urther'that the cooperative
dairy companies are the owners of the Board's capital, but the Act did identify
individual member ownership of the capital.
* The introduction of the Producer Boards Acts Amendment Bill. The bill grants
financial independence to all organisations established under the Primary Products
Marketing Act of 1953. This means that these organisations will no longer have to
obtain consent from the Minister ofFinance to make investments or to obtain loans. It
also made changes to the Apple and Pear Board.
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• The development of legislation by MAF for pest management, animal welfare,
chemical residues and other environmental related problems that affect health of people
engaged in the industry and the quality of food.
• Other activities affecting the farm and community sector have involved changes to
rural mail delivery which resulted in an increase of fees, and changes to the valuation of
livestock for income tax purposes.
Johnson concludes his Review up to 1993 by stating that: "Formal agricultural policies are
now confined to matters of hygiene, quality assurance, pest control and animal welfare. These
activities becoming more and more identified with better environmental control on production,
processing and exports." (p 398).··
4.4 Other Structural Changes Affecting Agriculture
Following the introduction of reform in 1984 and the cancellation of all agricultural subsidies it
was apparent that the former organisational structure which had evolved to provide policy
advice, develop and deliver the programs related to policy decisions was no longer
appropriate. One would expect also that reorganisation was also needed to facilitate further
changes that were seen to be needed in the new philosophy of government.
Johnson (1994) explains that through 1985 and 1986 a major reorganisation took place of the
agencies which were concerned with land, water and forestry. He explains that this was in
response to the election promises made to the environmental lobby to separate the policy and
delivery functions. The former Departments of Lands, Forestry and the Environment
Commission were re-organised into a Department of Conservation, a Ministry for the
Environment, a Ministry of Forestry and a residual Department of Lands. Commercial
activities in forestry and lands were transferred into state owned enterprises (SOEs) called
Forest Corp and LandCorp.
In 1988 the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was reorganised. The nine technical
divisions were transformed into four "businesses" and established separate financial control
systems with inter-divisional charging,
In 1991 the policy functions were separated from the delivery functions and a new policy unit
was created called MAF Policy.
The Ministry had debated how far it could go in introducing charging (user pay). Charging for
meat inspection, extension and other services was introduced in 1985. At this time there was
no further move tocfeate "SOEs. Agriculture New Zealand 'as thedeIivery mechanism for
extension and MAF Quality Management for inspection remained in the Ministry.
On February 1, 1995 Agriculture New Zealand was privatised by selling it to Wrightson's.
On July 1 1995 a separate Department of Fisheries was created. The name MAF remains but
the "F" no longer refers to Fisheries. There was the recommendation that the name be
changed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. It is my understanding that this
recommendation was blocked by the current Minister of Health, Jenny Shipley, as she argued
that food has to do with health. Too bad, as it robs agriculture of the important orientation of
saying that agriculture must recognise that what it is producing is not just primary
commodities, but food. It would thus show that the government recognised the need for
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orienting the agricultural industries toward the consumer, domestically and internationally. It
would also have been consistent with the government's goal of increasing value added in
agriculture. The need of a consumer oriented agriculture has been recognised by New
Zealand's agricultural industries. This point was recognised in Canada years ago with the
change in name, first I believe, in Ontario (OMAF), other provinces and eventually at the
federal level with AAFC.
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SECTION 5
EVALUATION OF REFORM
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to provide a general evaluation of reform in New Zealand as it
relates to the economy in general,,().nd the agricultural sector in particular. The focus is on
those questions and issues that relate to economic analysis and policy. The specific questions
that are dealt with include: .' - " . . .' .
does the current system efficiently and effectively provide the kinds of information
required for informed policy debate and development (both inside and outside of
government)?
• does the relevant information get to all stakeholders who require it? Identify the key
stakeholders/clients outside of government.
• what are the significant gaps in the ability of the current system to supply the kinds of
information required now and into the future and what are the implications of any shift
in the policy agenda away from a traditional commodity/support focus?
• has there been a decline in the policy role of agricultural economists?
5.2 Assessment of Reform: The Substance
There is little question that overall reform in New Zealand was overdue given the state of the
economy in terms of indebtedness and economic growth. There is no purpose to document
this point as it is well established in the literature. However, a few points should be made.
New Zealand set out in 1984 with the new Labour government to gain control over the
economy. The goal was to bring spending in line with revenue, to eliminate deficits, bring
down the debt and reduce the level of inflation, To do this the government made the Reserve
Bank independent of politicians. Since 1990 theReserve Bank has had complete control over
monetary policy. The main responsibility of the Bank is price stability. The government has
set the inflationtarget ..aLO..:2.per.cent.:, ,As. Ihe"Economist.rep.orts,".~inflation. targets provide
transparency and accountability. The Economist states that New Zealand now probably has
the best fiscal and monetary policy framework of any country in the world." (The Economist,
October 7, 1995)
The CPI which increased by 13.3 percent in 1985, 13.1 percent in 1986 and 18.2 percent in
1987 was reduced to 0.9 percent in 1993, 1.3 percent in 1994 and 4.0 percent in 1995. Public
overseas debt was $31.3 billion in 1985. This has been reduced to $15.6 billion in 1995.
Public debt as a percent of GDP is still 31.0 percent (Canada's is 64.2 percent). However,
government spending as a percent of GDP is still high at 38.2 percent (Canada's at 25.8
percent).
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The Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) provides principles for responsible fiscal management.
The aim is to encourage fiscal responsibility in government behaviour through an open and
transparent budget process. More of the details are summarised in the Canadian Auditor
General's Report.
Before leaving the issue of how reform affected the role and the efficiency in government it is
useful to briefly examine the pattern of government revenue and expenditures. These are
outlined in Table 5.1 for selected years. The Table shows that government expenditure
increased significantly in nominal terms up to 1984, the year of major reform under the new
Labour government, but continued to rise even after reform. The key difference between
before and after 1984 has been the slowly improvement in the financial balance. In 1994 the
government achieved its first positive financial balance of $424 million and an -operating
surplus of $755 million (not shown)F.or 1995 the operating balance has been estimated at
$2,695 million and projected at $3,600 million for 1997 by Bed Consulting Group.
The Table 5.1 row Table 2 Surplus indicates total government cash revenues less total
government such expenditure. Conceptually, it is the government using cash to purchase (or
sell) assets. In 1989 there was a surplus of $1,733 million. This included the sale of Post
Bank ($678.5 million), Air New Zealand ($660 million) and Rural Bank ($550 million) to
name the most important sales of government assets. This was a sharp contrast to 1984 when
the government had a $3, 101 million deficit in this account.
Table 5.1 figures are in nominal terms. If they are deflated by the CPI it shows (not shown in
the Table) that real government expenditure has not changed much between 1984 and 1994.
What has changed has been government revenue which has generated the improving account
balance. This observation coupled with the additional fact that the government after 1988 and
in particular between 1989 and 1992 sold off a very large percentage of its assets further
would cause one to question the efficiency gains with reform in terms of government
operations.
It brings into question whether the New Zealand government after reform has in fact been
more efficient. Has it in fact been able to eliminate waste inside government that has been
attributed to New Zealand with reform?
This study cannot hope to fully explain the changes that have taken place since 1984. The
main answer to these questions must be based on examining the structural changes that have
taken place on the expenditure side.
The first stage of reform after 1984 was taken up with the reduction of transfer payments, but
this was offset byrlsing··interestrates"tlelipledcwith increasing-debt. '-: -In-the second stage of
reform after 1991 the government attempted to reduce welfare commitments but this was
offset by rising unemployment and thus the need for greater payments. One of the main areas
for improvement in expenditure is with the cost of debt servicing. For 1992 this was $6.2
billion. It declined to $4.3 billion in 1993 and to $2.9 billion in 1994. It is forecast to remain
about $3.2 billion for the next three years.
On the revenue side taxation revenue increased from $23.9 billion in 1992 to $27.7 billion in
1994 and to $30.2 billion in 1995. Another source was the fact that the SOEs were starting to
pay dividends to the government.
36
Possibly the efficiency gains from reform in terms of the economy should not be confused with
efficiency gains of the bureaucracy itself. This 'issue however will have to remain largely at the
hypothesis stage for the purposes of this study.
The philosophy of the reform process has been to have government establish an emphasis on
the macro side of the economy and to leave the micro side to the market. The government has
attempted to extricate itself where ever it can from interference in the day-to-day running of
the economy. It has followed a policy of privatisation and commercialisation. It has
attempted to reduce regulation wherever possible.
The several industries that were interviewed were in full agreement with the reforms which
have been undertaken. Federated Farmers Inc., to the extent that it represents farmer opinion
in New Zealand, is also supportive-Oflhe general thrustofreform. Itwasn't cleaLat.the.time
that subsidies were eliminated in 1984 that farmers and agriculture would be better off. In the
same year about 40 percent of the income of beef and sheep farmers came from subsidies.
With the 1985 devaluation, the $NZ rose, interest rates climbed, and agricultural prices fell in
1986 and 1987. Farm stock value fell along with land prices. But initial fears of farm failure
did not materialise and only 800 farms faced forced sales. Some exit assistance was provided.
Table 5.1
Government Revenues and Expenditures, Selected Years 1975 to 1994
($ million)
Item 1975 1979 1984 1989 1994
Expenditure 3,411 6,848 14,250 23,741 29,174
Revenue 3,454 6,151 11,974 22,787 29,598
Financial balance 43 -697 -2,276 -954 424
Table 2 surplus -390 -1,446 -3,101 1,733 739
CPI (1960 = 100) 223 379 692 1,188 1,370
Source: Tables developed by Paul Dalziel, Lincoln University, based on Government
ofNew Zealand Financial Statements
When the subsidies were ended the cost of farm inputs came down, partly as a result of
reduced protection for the manufacturing sector and due to the oligopolistic selling of
suppliers. As Federated Farmers report: "Previously those supplying farm inputs including
labour, contractors, processing and the like, gained much of the benefit of subsidies. They
knew the farmers had the money to pay, funded by the tax payer, and charged accordingly."
(Life After Subsidies).·~This·ended·With-theend'of"subsidieS';"iIiput'Prices'fell as fanners also
slashed their expenditures.
Federated Farmers state that prior to reform in 1984, most agricultural sector organisations
put most of their effort into seeking various types of government support. This has now
ended and Federated Farmers is now committed on behalf of farmers to advocate that reform
be applied to other sectors of the economy to make them as efficient as the agricultural sector.
The emphasis is now to further reduce costs in the agricultural sector. Federated'Farmers sees
that farmers have become more resilient and in charge of their own destiny. It has not meant
the end of the family farm. The organisation states that there is a good life after subsidies.
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The key question is still the one that was posed in Section 1 (see also Section 6.7) of the
report, which was, "what are the appropriate role(s) and responsibilities for the government
for the future development of the agricultural industry?" It would appear that Federated
Farmers see the role of government to manage macro policy to provide the best climate for
business in terms of stable input prices, low interest rates, low levels of taxes, and actions that
will lead to the further reduction in production and marketing costs. That is, the government's
role is to work toward greater efficiency and effectiveness for the agricultural industry.
A similar view seems to be held by industry. Industries as represented by the main agricultural
Boards (i.e. Wool and Dairy) are looking inward for reforms and increased efficiency and
effectiveness. Implicitly the policies that they are following are those of a transactional cost
paradigm. They see the need to focus on the consumer and the market, and to develop the
mechanisms to provide vertical system-coordination,backto the producer. They .are strong
supporters of research and development and technology transfer. What isn't clear is if they
see the government as a full partner in working t-award industry effectiveness and efficiency.
They see the government providing funds to support research, setting standards of quality and
monitoring but not necessarily doing the inspection, and working toward eliminating trade
barriers internationally.
It is not clear what role industry sees for government in contributing to sustainable agriculture
in terms of resource management. It is also not clear if industry sees government playing a
role in improving the quality of rural life and community stability. It is also not clear to what
degree industry fully understands the need for improving vertical system coordination and the
role that government can and needs to play in this area.
5.3 Assessment of Reform: The Process in Terms of Economic and
Policy Analysis
The evaluation of how reform has affected economic and policy analysis and delivery is based
on several approaches. The first will be to review what is in the current literature. The second
is to summarise the assessment of the issue as based on interviews with government, industry
and academics. The third approach is to invoke a modified information paradigm and to
attempt apply it to questions for policy analysis.
5.3.1 The Literature
(a) R. Johnson l
His analysis of the policy process is· particularly interesting and useful as it contrasts how
economic and policy analysis" was carried ouri'arid<lelivefed in 'tl1epei'iod prIor to the
introduction of contracting in government. The title of his Presidential Address was The
National Interest, Westminister and Public Choice. "The objective of the paper was to analyse
changes in New Zealand agricultural policy over the last twenty years from the standpoint of
public choice and administrative theory and to draw general conclusions. Particular attention
will be paid to the role of agricultural economists in government and the role of information in
the political and administrative process" (Johnson, p.2)
1 In his Presidential address to the Australian Agricultural Economics Society in Wellington, on February 8,
1994 Dr Johnson provides his assessment of not only agricultural policies in New Zealand but the policy
process itself.
38
As has been previously described, the State Sector Act(1988) established a new framework for
the relationship between heads of Departments and their Ministers in terms of a contracts
approach. The contractual relationship specifies what the department is to deliver as outputs
in terms of the purchase agreements and the performance agreements specify the quality
dimensions of the outputs. One of these outputs is policy advice which all departments
require. Johnson reports that there has been some concern over whether government gets
"good value for its money". He explains that the State Services Commission carried out a
review in 1991 which concluded that the conflict that Ministers face in trying to reduce costs
yet obtain advice, result in the purchase of more policy advice than is required. A possible
approach advocated by Treasury was to introduce the market mechanism as a solution;
putting more of policy advice out to tender. Johnson states that, "However, difficulties arise
with Ministers, there are confidentiality considerations, and transaction ,costs .. could be
considerably higher. Treasury has"therefore, -turned toward aninternaLrules appro~hwhich
concentrates on improving production and quality control -. processes, adopting a corporate
planning approach including a fiscal cap,better'specification-ofpolicy advice outputs, and
better pricing of outputs." (p.18)
When it comes to monitoring the performance of Chief Executives much of the responsibility
rests with the State Services Commission however it is done in consort with the Minister.
Under section 43 of the State Sector Act it states: "43. Review of performance of chief
executive - (1) The Commission shall be responsible to the appropriate Minister or
appropriate Ministers for reviewing, either generally or in respect of any particular matter, the
performance of each chief executive. (2) In carrying out its functions under subsection (1) of
this section, the Commission shall report to the appropriate Minister or appropriate Ministers
on the manner and extent to which the chief executive is fulfilling all of the requirements
imposed upon that chief executive, whether under this Act or otherwise." ( State Sector Act,
p.22). This is somewhat of a departure from the Westminister model where the Minister
would have more of the responsibility for the performance of his Department Head or in this
case Chief Executive. However the New Zealand model of management has led to the
development of a much more explicit relationship between the Minister (government) in terms
of responsibilities and performance than under the current Westminister system in place in the
United Kingdom.
The Public Finance Act(1989) provided for the improved financial management in support of
the objectives of the State Sector Act. The system would be based on accrual accounting
replacing the cash flow system, Johnson says that: "This system thus provides for
comparative costs of purchasing policy advice both within, and without government" The
reforms stress administrative performance rather than quality of policy advice. They also force
departments to become leaner and meaner because they have more control over the delivery of
outputs. They increase{he{lew·ofmanagementinfofmatieu·p0ssibly·t'Oanexcess.But, they
do little or nothing for improved quality, relevance and supply of information to all interest
groups." (p.20). As Johnson explains, groups like the Federated Farmers change their
strategies from extracting favours from the political system to extracting returns from the
market place. This is not necessarily a bad thing. But taken to excess it could lead to having
groups like Federated Farmers begin to ignore the role that the government should be playing
for the development of an efficient and effective agriculture.
Johnson states that: "Free and frank advice is at the heart of the Westminister system". He
says that the State Sector Act alters the relationship between Minister and chief executive. He
explains further that the purchase and performance agreements for monitoring outputs may
,formalise the relationship probably to the detriment of the Minister receiving frank policy
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advice that is not in any way related to the process of accountability. "This form of agency
theory could drive a wedge between a Minister and his or her own department, where
Westminister theory holds the two to be indivisible." (p.24).
In looking specifically at the effects of reform in general and the specifics of administrative
reform in agriculture Johnson comes to several conclusions. These tend to be consistent with
points being raised elsewhere in this study. They are in summary form:
•
•
one of the main effects of assistance reform (meaning a lessening of concern for micro
policy intervention) and the dominance of macroeconomic policy meant the reduction
of the power and importance of periphery departments like agriculture and a
concentration of power in the Treasury and the Reserve Batik.
the application of the separation principle of policy (program) development from
delivery has resulted in the case of the- science function improving on science
(research) activities but "left technology transfer a poor orphan". (p.23). As raised
elsewhere in the report it is not yet clear what privatisation of extension will mean for
good technology transfer in the agricultural industry, and in particular farmers.
the new process is likely to result in increased staff in Ministers' offices. Where the
direct line of policy advice is affected by the new managerial system Ministers will turn
to in office staff for political and other policy advice. Policy advisers in the department
will be at greater arms-length which will favour a policy unit in the office that is more
directly responsible to him or her.
• the tendency toward less direct intervention will result in economists working more on
institutional structures, legislation and monitoring systems and less on interventionist
mechanisms. In examining the changes with respect to the resource use under the
Resource Management Act and the process of reform of marketing board legislation
Johnson is concerned that: "current reforms have tended to reinforce the private
interest view of self-determination and decentralisation.". "These changes do not go
far enough in preserving some authority for central government." (p.2S).
• on the role of information, Johnson stresses that equality and access to information is a
vital ingredient to good policy making. He sees government being a provider of
information especially where market failure exists and this would help to balance the
power of different interest groups throughincreased transparency. It is his observation
that departments have actually reduced the size of their information departments. In
MAF the information department was disbanded and the distribution network
privatised. "He·,·conGludes .,that4he··mle··ef ·infofmationas ;a public good has been
overlooked. Information is critical to the economic research activity of a department
which means that the information gathering, storage and retrieval system needs to be
well developed. This has to be closely coordinated with the policy advice function.
(See section 5.4 information/decision paradigm)
• there has been a reorientation of economic analysis in agriculture away from the farm
level. Economic analysis has been retained for international trade, but this was because
of the GATT negotiations. There is a tendency to see policy matters as technical
matters and, "The outcome is likely to be a decline in the role of economists and of
economic research in the Ministry". (p.26).
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• Johnson concludes that the role of and importance of the agricultural bureaucracy has
been lessened because general government reform has been directed to less
government intervention.
In interviews with Dr Johnson, he stressed that Minister's staff numbers have not increased as
much as was first thought, and the Westminister system continues to have a wide influence on
policy development and acceptance. He expressed some surprise that staff numbers in
Agriculture Policy were maintained at such a high level, without a considered and focused
research component.
Dr Johnson stresses the wide public belief that government should generate its own advice
within the traditional confidential Westminister arrangements.
(b) Jonathan Boston
Jonathan Boston is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Victoria University in Wellington.
In recent years he has published widely on such issues as aspects of social policy, higher
education policy and public sector reform as well as moral theology. Recent works include
Reshaping the State (co-editor, 1991), Voices for Justice (co-editor, 1994), The State Under
Contract (editor) and Public Management: the New Zealand Model (J. Boston, et al.)
forthcoming 1996.
For the purposes of this report we are particularly interested in his analysis and views on
contracting in government, especially contracting out of policy advice. Two sources have
been used to provide insights on his perspective and conclusions.
In Chapter 4 "Inherently Governmental Functions and the Limits to Contracting Out", The
State Under Contract he examines the extent to which government has gone in contracting out
its functions. He states that in New Zealand consultants are being used increasingly to
formulate policy advice and to provide other related policy advisory services. He says that in
certain cases ministers are employing consultants to advise on their strategies for purchasing
departmental outputs. He raises these questions: "whether there are certain public functions
which only government employees should carry out? Does the integrity, legitimacy and even
perhaps the sovereignty of the state necessitate that certain distinctively public functions
should never be contracted out to private providers?" ( p.79).
Boston feels that to date these issues have not been examined or adequately debated in New
Zealand. He says that they have received more attention in other countries, in particular the
United States. He makes reference to an investigation in the early 1990s by the General
Accounting Office· (GAO)-.in -the United States '-0f{jootracting'{)ut'0f·functions which in its
opinion were inherently governmental in nature. The GAO was critical of the extent of
contracting out and called for guidelines on those functions of government that should not be
contracted out.
He reiterates the point that it was the Public Finance Act(1989) and the introduction of the
output system of appropriations that gave a boost to contracting out. In this system outputs
are more clearly specified including policy advice.
He indicates that the government purchased $245 million of policy advice from 32
departments in 1992/93 excluding the cost of diplomatic services. Out of this departments
spent $48.5 million in contracting out to third parties. He adds that government gets
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additional policy advice for free through royal commissions, from academics, conferences etc.
He points out that certain departments make a more extensive use of consultants than others;
agriculture was not one that he named. An important area for the use of consultants, by
Treasury and other Departments was for the valuation and setting strategies for the sale of
government utilities. This suggests that some of the necessary analytical skills have not been
retained or developedinthe government Departments.
Boston examines the argument which has been made for in-house versus contracting out of
policy advice. He bases his analysis on agency and transaction cost theory. His conclusion is
that: "Broadly speaking, there are likely to be significant advantages, in terms of minimising
both production and transaction costs, in placing a heavy reliance on in-house provision. This
certainly does not mean that all advice should be produced in-house, bufit suggests that there
are likely to be benefits in havingoan in-house advisory.capacity across the broad.sp.ectrum of
policy issues." (p.97). He is particularly concerned .about the problem of assessing and
monitoring quality ofpolicy outputs. He feels that the measures employed in New Zealand to
assess quality of policy advice are only proxies, and thus only indicators of quality.
One of Boston's main arguments for an in-house capability is that Ministers are not able to
specify in advance the policy advice that they need as Ministers hardly know the problems they
are likely to face next month, let alone next year.
(c) Jane Kelsey
Jane Kelsey, in her recent book The New Zealand Experiment, A World Model for Structural
Adjustment, 1995, raises similar questions about the inadequacy of monitoring and evaluation
procedures. She makes reference to an audit carried out by the New Zealand Auditor-General
in 1994 which, concluded that many departments failed to meet sound management standards
in awarding, monitoring and evaluating contracts, while inadequate documentation made some
contracts impossible to assess (p.143). In making reference to the New Zealand Auditor
General's report she states that: "Too little thought was given to the choice between
developing in-house skills or using private consultants." (p.143).
(d) Ralph Chapman
In an article in Public Sector, Vol. 18, No.2, June 1995, Ralph Chapman who is currently
serving as Manager, Strategic Policy, Ministry of the Environment, examines the current
deficiencies in and the potential for improving the links between outputs and strategic
outcomes sought by government in New Zealand. He further examines the related difficulties
in evaluating policy and in conducting policy related research in support of high quality policy
analysis.
He presents a model (not shown) that is not that dissimilar to the information/decision
paradigm as contained in section 5.4 except that it doesn't incorporate the input side. It does,
however, illustrate the importance of monitoring and evaluation and investing in strategic
result areas. He raises similar concerns with the current process that Ministers are not familiar
with the implications of their purchased outputs and the outcomes they seek. And Ministers
have not articulated their own views about the values and goals they seek in advance. He feels
that Departments face difficulties in delivering outputs where there are complex social and
environmental problems and where there is an inadequacy in understanding and analysing these
problems. He quotes the State Services Commissioner: "we have yet to establish a method to
determine whether and how the outputs contribute positively to the stated outcomes." In his
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portfolio, Chapman is concerned with the quality of the policy analysis and thus advice. He
states that, "A contributing factor is under-investment by Ministers and CEOs in staff
development, due in part to fiscal constraints and also to managers being under pressure to
deliver outputs."
Those interviewed in agriculture who have had a long association with MAP have expressed
the same concerns. My own impressions are that the problem is augmented in agriculture
when it comes to economic and policy analysis because, although the analysis is economic,
none of the upper level managers from the Chief Executive to the Group Director of MAF
Policy are economists. This problem can be overcome if upper management is careful to seek
the advice of their divisional directors in terms of the time and staffing required to deliver on
the outcomes desired and outputs specified. .In the case of MAF it would appear that this has
been neglected in the face of pushing through its institutional reforms (which have been of
major importance in term's of staff numbers and morale).
(e) Other sources
There are obviously other literature sources on the subject of the effect of overall reform and
reform to the internal workings of government which have not been cited. Colin James in
New Territory: the Transformation of New Zealand 1984-92 provides an interesting
perspective on how New Zealand moved from the "prosperity consensus" which it had
reached in the period of the 1950's to 1970s to a new radical restructuring of not only of the
economy but public attitude and expectation. Although he talks of administrative failure he
does this in a more general way and thus does not get to the heart of the issue of the
appropriate role of government and how it should manage and be managed. He states that
"governments should intervene in markets only to ensure fair play and to correct market
failure" .(p.311). He does not attempt to outline what he means by market failure.
A more current assessment of reforms in New Zealand is Economic Reforms in New Zealand
(forthcoming) edited by Alan Bollard, Ralph Lattimore and Brian Silverstone. The authors
here explain James's "prosperity consensus" as the "golden age" which emerged after 1945
and lasted until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Given the high rates of economic growth, low
levels of inflation, there were attempts to redistribute income. "These policies incorporated
increasing government intervention to provide social security and other programmes to deal
with apparent market failure." ( p.6) The new book attempts as stated in the Introduction, "to
study the impact ofNew Zealand's reforms in a detailed and integrated way". (p.14).
5.3.2 Evaluations Based on Interviews
(a) Industry
As outlined in Section 3 on the responses to the question of the adequacy of policy advice in
agriculture, most industry spokespersons did not see that there were any major gaps in
economic and policy advice at least from their perspectives. It is my impression, however,
that their perspective was for a government that was now seen to play a quite limited and
selective role in the agricultural and food sector. Macro policy would dominate micro policy,
and the former was the domain of Treasury and the Reserve Bank. There were areas,
however, where the government did have a role; in trade and establishing quality standards
and monitoring the regulation of quality, to name the two most important.
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Because there was little interaction between MAF Policy and industry in terms of industry
requesting economic and/or policy analysis industry spokespersons had little basis to comment
on the quality of outputs and hence the quality of staff in MAP.
Almost all those interviewed felt, however, that MAF and government in general required an
in-house capability to deliver policy advice. This in part I suspect was based on their own
point of view that industry (i. e. firms and agencies of industries) required their own in-house,
thus dedicated, economic and policy capability. Also everyone understands the convention
that policy advice is confidential to Ministers.
(b) Government
Here It IS important to also reco.gnise the need to_protect the confidentiality_ oCthose
expressing opinions on the issue of the system in place as well as the quality of economic and
policy advice being produced.
A general conclusion that can be drawn is that the current demand for economic and policy
advice in MAF is not high. There were several who raised questions of the quality of
economic and policy advice being provided. There were a number of statements made by
people at all levels both inside and outside ofMAF, that contributed to this assessment. These
were:
• that over the last several years the quality of staff in Agriculture Policy has
deteriorated. This is based on the fact that the unit has not replaced economists that
held Ph.Ds. There are now very few with graduate standings. Salaries are not
competitive with industry to attract good quality graduates. There is little in the way
of assistance for upgrading and maintaining professional competency. Much of the
work that is required is not sufficiently challenging to require rigorous analysis.
• MAF lost its good quality middle management/professional people to other Ministries
and have not replaced them.
• that MAF Agriculture Policy is not really doing "research" but concentrates on day-to-
day responses with a heavy load in the legislative area.
• too little opportunity for middle management to provide input into the decision making
in terms of establishing priorities for policy and economic analysis and for determining
the capability of delivering the outputs in the Purchase Agreement. Some felt that the
1995 Purchase Agreement was prepared too quickly with some indication that the
planning schedule was"net4'ollowed"ln,some-f0spects4ne'P1.ifchase Agreement was
loosely worded and statements that would have described the analytical function were
missing.
• the view that policy work cannot be encompassed in a purchase agreement and that
existing agreements are dominated by 'top down' procedures.
• if there is any rigorous work on trade policy being done it is being done in MFAT.
The outlook group in MAP have used production models but not trade models for the
preparation of information for the trade area.
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• there is a difference of opinion on how well the contract system is working. Generally
upper management thinks that it is and lower management is more skeptical.
• leadership in MAF has been dominated by institutional reform at the cost of clear lines
of communication for policy advice and analysis. In addition the likelihood that
administrators don't fully recognise the difference between analysis and advice and the
added problem that this distinction has not been clarified.
(c) Opinions from outside of government
A general opinion that there are problems with the delivery of economic and policy advice in
MAF. This is based on the opinion that· the quality of professionals has deteriorated in MAF
in recent years.
Opinion that MAF analysts need to be put in the··mainstreamef policy advice. They were at
one time, but not know. Disagreement over the splitting of the development of policy and its
delivery.
Dr Elliott is on record of expressing the opinion that there needed to be a mix of disciplines in
MAF Policy to include sociologists, political scientists along with economists. That is, policy
making must look at the issues from different perspectives. He is on record of saying that
there is a need for leadership in MAF that understands the cultural values of agriculture and
agriculture itself
5.4 Evaluation Based on Information/Decision Paradigm
One approach to evaluating the appropriateness of the system that is now in place to produce
economic and policy analysis, is to approach it in terms of an information/decision paradigm.
A simple conceptualisation of this model is shown in Figure 5.1. Many will recognise it as the
Bonnen model of information theory. It has been modified to incorporate the elements of the
outcome/output components of the contracting system.
The purpose of the model is to focus on the realisation that outcomes are a function of good
decision making which is a function of producing the right information. Another reality is that
the system is dynamic and there has to be feed back in terms of the results that are achieved.
The evaluation process must be able to assess the extent to which goals as outcomes were
achieved in relation to expectations. If there is a gap between the ends achieved and those
expected there has to be an assessment made in terms of the future. Are goals and thus
outcomes reassessed or is the process static? As Boston and others have stated it is difficult
to determine whai'constrtutesnquafity·whefi'it"comes'to'policy·'advice. 'The same holds for
producing information on which decisions have to be made 'at the ministerial level.
The core component of the decision model begins with the identification of problems and
issues that require resolution. These have to be seen in terms of the goals that are set in
relation to government policy, that is the outcomes that are established as objectives. These
must come through the political process and are thus based on input from the electorate and
various organisations that are able to influence public policy. It is the responsibility of the
Minister (or Cabinet) to articulate the outcomes directly or through the Chief Executive so
that the analysts are able to begin to apply the appropriate research framework to eventually
produce information as outputs for appropriate decision making.
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The more difficult the problem the greater is the need for good analysis. This starts with
conceptual and theoretical development. The model shows that there is three components to
analysis; theory, methodology and data. The model illustrates that the methodology coupled
with theory creates a demand for data as input. Data collection is critical to the analytical
process. The products as outputs are the information that is an input to decision making.
The model clearly distinguishes between data and information. Based on information,
decisions can be made to generate the outcomes as originally specified.
It is after decisions have been made and where results can be observed that evaluation should
occur. Evaluation can only appropriately be made against the outcomes achieved in relation to
outcomes that were established apriori. The model illustrates that the quality of the analysis
and hence results in terms of information is dependent on the inputs made by decision makers
and in the case of policy analysis theprofessional/research.staff
The purpose is to attempt to explicitly show- that the contracting process of developing
purchase agreements and performance agreements has to take into account the quality of the
model required to generate the information as outputs. This model helps to make clear the
various concerns that have been raised (as previously discussed) about how economic and
policy analysis is being carried out in MAF at present.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
It appears that the information requirement of the policy process are being fully met by
informal research activities of policy analysts and consultation with interested parties. The
New Zealand model of the Westminister style of government does not appear to encourage
wider informed policy debate, or sharing of views before a decision is. taken. At times
conference style consultations have been employed in New Zealand but less frequently in
recent years. The last major conference held in agriculture was in 1963.
The State Sector Act (1988) identifies the main stakeholder for information as government
itself The public information role of departments has decreased (as Johnson points out).
Industry sources interviewed stressed their self-sufficiency in supplying their own information
needs for economic and policy analysis. However it is Johnson's opinion that industry has
been consulted more than they seem to have indicated.
The amount of research backing agricultural policy research has declined over recent years.
Dr Johnson suggests that the amount of such research has never been at the level taken as
normal in Agriculture Canada or the USDA(ERS). MAF devotes considerable staff resources
to its commodity outlook function and the necessary research support needed, but does not
appear to haveevaluated'ur' 'set'out« a 'tonger term"strategy-for" 'supportive research of its
various responsibilities in terms of the outcomes that have been delineated.
The system that is in place does not appear to adequately or clearly distinguish between the
analysis and advice components of policy.
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SECTION 6
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM REFORM
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to examine what can be learned from the reforms that New
Zealand has made since 1984. The focus is on the changes to the roles and responsibilities
that government has taken to the economy. In particular the focus is on how the government
has reorganised its bureaucracy to deliver those goods and services that it sees are its mandate
in the area that requires economic and policy analysis. The specific questions that need to be
addressed include:
• what are some of the key lessons that government and analysts have learned over the
last decade in terms of how to fund and supply economic and policy analysis?
• to what extent has commercialisationJprivatisation played a role in New Zealand's
reform of how economic and policy analysis is carried out and what have they learned
from this?
• what lessons can Canada and AAFC take from the New Zealand experience on how
government (and other stakeholders) obtain the information and analysis and for
informed policy development?
• what lessons are there for Canada as it deals with the restructuring of how AAFC
obtains its analysis and tries to meet the needs of other stakeholders for information
(i.e. provincial governments, farm organisations, the environmental community, agri-
business firms, other nations etc.)?
These are all pertinent and important questions, however, they are difficult questions. As was
discussed in previous sections, the system and the process of delivering economic and policy
analysis, as are other functions of government, and still evolving. The managerial system that
has been adopted by government was only started to be seriously debated. The biggest
problem seems to be that there has been limited analysis on the current managerial system and
its performance to provide substance to the debate.
It is important ·to·'recognise-that°-the··equivalent"uf-provinceswith· their own jurisdictional
powers over agriculture and trade do not exist in New Zealand as they do in Canada.
Government in the New Zealand sense largely means the national government. Local
government does have certain jurisdictional powers but they tend to be minor in relation to the
power and thus responsibilities at the national governmental level. This observation, however,
probably requires further investigation.
As was outlined at the beginning of the study it is critical for the determination of economic
and policy advice in government to determine the role that government is to play in future.
The lessons to be learned from the reform process in New Zealand must in the final analysis be
evaluated against what is first determined for the role of government under reform in Canada.
In ending the study a perspective is provided on what the role of government should be.
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6.2 Lessons Learned for Funding Economic and Policy Analysis
in New Zealand
• Given that the government sees its roles and responsibilities largely in the area of
macro economics it is understandable that policy analysis is concentrated in The
Treasury. Treasury employs about 200 policy analysts and managers which constitutes
about 15 percent of the government's expenditure on policy advice.
• The emphasis on policy advice in the area of the Treasury has meant that the best
qualified economists (based on the level of education) from MAF moved to Treasury.
They have not been replaced in MAF and this is likely to have partly affected the type
and quality of economic and policy analysis that is being carried out iriMAF (if present.
Other reasons are provided below. This' conclusion is lent support by a recent
statement made by Dr Russ Ballard who has just finished a term of over six years as
the CEO of MAF. He was largdy 'instrumental iIi' tIle restructuring that has taken
place in MAF as previously outlined in the report. In the March 1996 issue of MAF
Update Dr Ballard expressed the opinion that turning MAF into a customer driven
organisation was a good decision but felt that the large amount of resources being
channelled into front line output would eventually adversely affect MAF. He is then
quoted as saying: "I hope that there's an opportunity to re-examine the amount of
output the Minister expects this organisation to deliver. I believe we're already too
lean. We don't have the money to invest in staff training and internal info-structures.
You can keep this up for a while, but then your quality is going to start to slip." (p. 1).
• Although economic and policy analysis is seen as an important function for
government, and given that agriculture represents about 60 percent of export trade
earnings there remains a focus on trade analysis in MAF. However, it would appear
that the serious trade analysis is being done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MFAT). Much of what is done in the area of trade in MAF is to monitor and
report on agricultural and policy developments internationally. The Department has
not developed any empirical model to analyse trade issues. It does not appear to have
the resources to do this and this work does not appear in the Purchase Agreements.
Agriculture provides input to the analysis being carried out in MFAT. MAF's role is
to provide the commodity expertise and not the trade modeling expertise. Outlook
work is the sale preserve of the MAF. Its forecasts are based in part on the use of
econometric models.
• The emphasis in government for reducing costs coupled with the new managerial
approach that has evolved out of the State Sector Act (1988) and Public Finance Act
(1989) have probably affected the quantity ana certainly the qu'ality of economic and
policy analysis that is being produced in MAF. This is in part based on the hypothesis
that the decisions made by the Minister and CEO in terms of what outputs are required
and their quality in relation to outcomes desired have resulted in too little attention
being paid to the professional staffing in Agricultural Policy in MAF and in part, by a
heavier load of legislative work arising from the Resource Management Act and the
regulatory agencies (bureaus).
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6.3 Role of Privatisation and Commercialisation in the Delivery of
Economic and Policy Analysis Under Reform
• Policy analysis is still largely provided from in-house established policy units in
government departments. Total government expenditure on policy advice has been
estimated at $245 million for 1992/93. This translates into 1,220 person equivalents.
Based on a 1994 report by the Auditor Generals Office $48.5 million was the cost of
advice contracted out to third parties, and little of this is the area of agriculture.
• The issue of the role of privatisation, and hence commercialisation of policy under
reform is not an issue in New Zealand. It is an issue for which it is difficult to provide
supplementary quantitative analysis. The literature provides arguments on all
extremes. The arguments arestilliatgely Conceptual and theoretical which makes it
difficult to determine the optimal balance between in-house and contracting out of
policy advice in particular. If oned.raws a distinction between economic analysis and
policy advice then it is even less clear what the conclusion should be. On privatisation,
the literature is primarily focused on policy advice as distinct from economic advice.
In the New Zealand case, the accepted view is that confidentiality requires internal
policy staffing.
• Evidence is that the academic community is at present playing a limited role in research
for government in economic and policy analysis. In the days of greater government
intervention prior to 1984 this role was greater at least based on the experience of the
AERU at Lincoln University(see section 4). At present MAF has few contracts with
the academic community for either economic and/or policy analysis. In talking to
several people about the relationship between university and government there would
appear to be little tradition in New Zealand for the type of collaborative and level of
contract work that exists in the North America.
6.4 Lessons Learned from Privatisation and Commercialisation
for Economic and Policy Analysis
• There has been a limited amount of privatisation in how economic and in particular
policy analysis is being carried out in New Zealand. All those who were interviewed in
MAF and The Treasury and asked about the issue of privatisation were quite clear that
full privatisation of the function of economic and policy analysis was never seriously
considered in the process of reform.
• According to Boston government departments are prohibited from selling their
services to non-governmental clients. The government is the sole purchaser of
departmental policy outputs. From MAF some outputs such as the outlook report
(SONZA) which are provided to industry but this output is merely an offshoot of what
the department produces for internal needs. SONZA is sold on a cost recovery basis.
MAF currently uses private consultants (who were the former extension agents of
government) for the collection of some agricultural data.
• It is unlikely that a privatised government agency in the area of the agricultural sector
could find a market for its services except for the occasional study that agricultural
agencies contract out. This conclusion, however, should be taken as tentative as it is
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based on a limited sample of industry contacts, but those industries that were
interviewed tended to represent the main industries in agriculture. Those that were
interviewed, said that they would not buy services from government and this would
probably include a privatised MAF Agriculture Policy. I am not aware, however, of
any survey that has been carried out to determine the demand for economic analysis or
policy analysis in the agricultural private sector.
Lessons for Canada and AAFC on How Government and Other
Stakeholders Obtain Economic and Policy Analysis
Many of the main agricultural sectors (industries) in New Zealand have developed their
own in-house economic and policy units. Some, however, already" had their own
economic units prior to 1984. There is virtl1allyno reliance on government eCbnomic
and policy analysis for their needs. There is also little indication that these units
purchase economic analysis (or policy advicerona""regular basis from outside their
units. It must be noted that to industries policy analysis largely now means analysis for
the development of policies for firm or industry strategic planning, rather than policies
for influencing government.
There is no indication that industry and government have even seriously discussed
cooperating in carrying out economic analysis which they both require or for MAF to
do economic analysis for industry.
Lessons for Canada in Restructuring of How AAFC Obtains its
Analysis and Attempts to Meet the Needs of Other Stakeholders
If Canada were to look to New Zealand as a model to reform its economic and policy
analysis and advice it would not privatise it, except in a very limited way. It would
appear that there never was any serious attempt or even consideration to privatise
economic and policy analysis in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. This doesn't
say that outside consultants are not used, but the core of economic and policy analysis
is still carried out in-house. This has been a tradition in New Zealand and New
Zealand has stuck with it.
• If Canada follows what has happened in New Zealand as a result of government reform
and adopts a policy of non intervention in the economY,except for macro economics in
terms of monetary and fiscal policy, it will find that the private sector will look inward
and not to government for its future development. That is, when the Canadian
government ceases to provide subsidies andoth(;(r.direGt forms QCassistance to the
agricultural sector it will find that initially, based on the situation in New Zealand, that
the agricultural sector will develop a strong independence. The agricultural sector will
no longer look to government as a major provider of income and only in a limited way
other services. It will see government in terms of providing an improved climate in
which the private agricultural sector can function. If it follows the New Zealand case
industries that have statutory marketing board legislation will seek to obtain greater
autonomy and seek reform in the functioning of their legislation Industry will look to
government for the provision of establishing regulations where there is the danger of
capture but will want the actual application of regulation to be made contestable.
Government will still be looked to for the monitoring of the delivery of regulation,
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however. When the government seeks to apply user pays, industry will demand that
the regulatory services be made contestable.
A more independent agricultural sector especially in those areas that are reliant on the
international market will still look to government for providing leadership in improving
the conditions for market access. Where this leadership and thus analysis comes from
in the federal government is another issue. In the New Zealand case, MAP has wound
up with a minimal role in economic analysis other than to assemble information and
describe developments internationally. It would appear that MAP has been placed
more in the data and fact gathering role component of providing information. (refer to
Figure 5.1).
It is likely that government,will beTequired...to play an ,important-role in the area of
agricultural sustainability as influenced by the Resource Management Act. There will
be growing conflicts between farmers· and industry over'resource management which
will have to be resolved by government. Whether this is at the local, (provincial in
Canada,) or national level is not clear at present in the case of New Zealand. It is also
likely, following the case of New Zealand that there will need to be increased attention
paid to problems and to issues that involve the human aspects of agriculture. There
are major structural adjustments that are taking place in New Zealand that require
increased social research to provide information on deciding how to provide
educational, health, recreational, and other services. There is evidence that this is seen
as a problem at the Ministerial level but it has not been fully translated into outputs and
thus the budget (Purchase Agreement). In this case the budget for Rural Resources
does not provide for in-house research although it does provide for some research
outside of the Ministry. The research, to the extent that is being carried out, is
primarily in the universities and other agencies. Whether it is adequate given future
problems is not clear. My general assessment and judgement is that it is not.
Although there has been research carried out on risk and uncertainly in agriculture
there would appear to be inadequate applied work being done. There are no safety net
programs in place. There is little or no work being carried out on the development of
risk management strategies for farmers such as the use of derivatives. Whether this is
a role for government is a matter of opinion. It certainly does not appear at present in
the recent Purchase Agreements. To what degree the private sector will invest in these
areas is not clear. It depends to what degree they are seen to be public goods, and
hence will be under invested in by the private sector.
The Role of Government With Reform: A Perspective
The problem for government is to determine those areas in which it must maintain influence
and/or control. Without attempting to write a discourse on the issue (or revisit Adam Smith),
one could argue convincingly that the government must continue to play a role where the
private sector has little or no capability in providing goods and services that tend to be
"public" in nature. One could also argue that the public expects government to work to
maintain an economically healthy economy and thus a rising standard of living for its people.
This raises the delicate question of how to do this, which has been at the heart of economic
and political philosophy historically. It would appear that with the failures of the socialist
(communist) experiments in the former USSR and Eastern Europe and elsewhere, that
capitalist ideology has generally prevailed. The question now is the nature of the capitalist
model, and the role ofgovernment in it.
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One area in which the government may have a responsibility in an indirect sense is to influence
the development of appropriate new institutions, especially those which industry requests or
requires but is incapable of developing on its own. There is clearly a role for government to
legitimise the formation of organisations and institutions that are legal in nature. Examples
here include the formation of coordinating and/or integrating groups such as councils,
marketing boards, or associations for the coordination of research and promotion, collection
of information, and other activities that farm and value added firms would not, or could not,
do under their own initiative. One example is the passage of enabling legislation at both
federal and provincial levels for the establishment of marketing boards and commissions. A
more recent case is where the government of Quebec fostered the creation of industry Round
Tables for the major commodity areas in order to help facilitate industry coordination and
development.
The presence of market failures is always held up as one of the key justifications for
government action. The problem is that there is little agreement· on what constitutes market
failure. Without attempting to get too deeply into the issue, one perspective is that of the
existence of externalities where the objective functions of private firms and agencies are
different from those of society. There are also public goods and services that receive too little
investment by the private sector.
One of the key questions is the extent to which nations are willing to subject their economies
to the market, that is to let their currencies float free, to reduce protection and to free capital
and labour movement. Has the new GATT agreement and the decision to form the WTO as a
more permanent body to work for the maintenance of unrestricted trade, ushered in a new era
for international trade? In particular, what implications does it have for agricultural and food
sectors? To what extent will countries like Japan and the ED submit their agricultural and
food sectors to less protection and less intervention? Already Japan, in particular is showing
resistance to abiding by the GATT agreement to which it was a signatory, let alone accepting
the Agreement's philosophy of less protection for its agriculture and food sector.
It can be argued that a globalized economy will result in greater specialisation and thus greater
trade, if one adheres to the theory of comparative advantage. This implies that there will be a
process of adjustment that will take place in economies, including agricultural and food
sectors. Those sectors that have been most protected are potential candidates for decline. In
Canada economists have speculated over the future of the supply managed sectors (dairy, and
the feather commodities) should protection be removed. In the ED what will be the effect on
the level of production, of demand and hence trade from what. has been agreed to under
GATT or from a further reduction in protection and subsidisation of production and trade? It
implies that there will be a process of sectoral and industry rationalisation. On a country basis
some industries will ·e*f>afid'ftnd~·'S0me'·1ndustries will"tlecline, c·so-me.. industries .'. may fail to
survive altogether.
This adjustment process places greater emphasis on the need for industries to achieve
increased efficiency and more importantly their effectiveness. Competitiveness will be the
essence of industry profitability. Industries that aren't efficient and effective in developing
new technology and new markets will not be profitable. Industries that have developed and
have functioned under border protection and subsidies will have to face competition from
imports, unlike previously.
Countries whose industries fail to adjust and increase their efficiency and effectiveness will not
prosper relative to those countries whose industries have. If there are gains from trade, all
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countries can potentially increase their standard of living even if their industries are not among
the most efficient, but the real winners will be those countries who have the most efficient and
thus competitive industries.
I now return to the question, what is the role of government in this new globalized economic
environment? Is it simply one of less government, which is what is implied if government is to
play a lesser role in the economy? Or is it a more specialised role that sees government in
partnership with industry in the pursuit of greater competitiveness? Or is it perhaps
partnership for the achievement of higher level societal goals which based on society's
demands cannot be ignored by the private sector? The future role of government in large part
depends on the perspective that is taken for industry adjustment and development. It hinges
also on what is required to make industries more efficient and effective and thus competitive
and responsive to societal goals.-
Agricultural and food industries in modern- industrialised-ecenomies are complex, meaning
specialised and vertically segmented. Efficiency comes from the development and adoption of
new cost reducing technologies. Efficiency also comes from effective vertical system
coordination. How can this be accomplished? Can governments leave it totally to industries
to sort this out, in a true "laissez faire" manner. Or do governments need to play a role in
assuring that the "correct' environment is in place that will ensure that new technology is
being developed and adopted? I would argue that there is an important role for government in
this area. This was one of the main criteria adopted in examining the role that the New
Zealand government has taken for the agricultural and food sector.
Another issue that affects the decision for the future role of government is the need for
preventing or correcting market failures. Firms and industries, unless they are altruistic, are
not likely to internalise the externalities that result from their economic activities. Society will
look to government for protection and compensation.
It is an issue that transcends international borders and permeates the trade environment. For
example, it has been an issue in NAFTA, in terms of Mexican environmental regulation
relative to that in the United States and Canada. Industries that are not required to internalise
their negative externalities, hence add to costs, are able to price commodities more
competitively.
This raises the broader question of appropriate regulation. It places governments in an
awkward position of trying to be both a partner and a policeman at the same time. It means
that industry must understand that government must play different roles, much like a parent
must do in raising a child. In well adjusted and trusting households, children learn to accept
and understand that the·usually oar1.ng-parents·oftenaFe>requiredbyo.the-children' s behaviour in
disobeying established rules, to punish their children. So too must firms and industries learn to
live and work with government in their capacities and requirements to nurture and to
discipline.
6.8 A Footnote to the Lessons and the Study
This paper does not entirely agree with the impressions that the report Toward Better
Governance by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada leaves with the reader, especially
when it discusses the organisational design of government management in New Zealand. The
adoption of contracting for services inside government has introduced certain efficiencies but
would appear to have had an adverse effect on the quality of policy analysis and advice.
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It is one of the hypotheses of this paper that the intellectualism that led to the development and
adoption of the current managerial system may not currently be in place to determine
equilibrium and thus the system's optimum. In other words if there is insufficient attention
paid to the current management system it is unlikely to strike the right balance in determining
the government's role in the economy and society given the goals that government seems to
have set for itself It is not fully clear if the State Sector Commission has placed sufficient
resources to carry on the development and monitoring of the new management system. This
responsibility and work would appear to rest with the State Sector Development Branch of the
State Sector Commission. Time will tell.
New Zealand seems to be only starting to examine and debate the benefits and costs of this
major element of reform and thus the appropriate level ·of government involvement in the
economy and society. As Boston and Chapman state,governrnent at the political leveLhas still
not fully absorbed the new model of government organisation and management.
The new managerialism that has been adopted in New Zealand for government should not be
fully adopted in Canada without great care and caution. There is much to commend what
reform has accomplished in New Zealand. But there is still much to be resolved in terms of
the appropriate roles for government especially for the future development of New Zealand
industry in agriculture.
There is still much to learn about the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the new model of
government organisation and management in the delivery of economic analysis and policy
advice for government. The debate over competitiveness versus cooperation in industry seems
to be developing in terms of improving on efficiency and effectiveness but the role(s) that
government is to play still needs to be resolved. Is government seen as a partner by industry
(and community) for its future development? Does government see itself as a partner with
industry? The dialogue that currently takes place seems to be at an informal level. Whether
this is sufficient to resolve this issue of industry-government relationships is not clear. This
paper (tentatively) suggests that it is not.
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APPENDIX A
APPROACHcTO STUDY
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A.l Introduction
The following provides the context in which the study was carried out and describes the
approach that was followed.
A.2 Background
The study was carried out as part of the sabbatical leave of Gary Storey who is Professor,
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan. The focus of the
sabbatical was:
•
•
to study the development of successful agricultural/food industries in terms of industry
organisation and vertical market coordination and integration in a number of areas that
would include: the development of appropriate institutional linkages between the
business, government and the research'community for the development of new
technology, human capital the accumulation of financial capital for industry growth and
development.
to study how agricultural economies and industries effectively adjust where there is a
major reduction in government involvement in terms of policies and programs that
directly and indirectly subsidise the industry. That is, how have industries replaced the
roles of government with new institutions"(Sabbatical Proposal, 1995).
The location of the sabbatical was to be New Zealand where the process of changing the role
of government has been very extensive. It was felt that New Zealand would provide the best
laboratory for this study. The Department of Economics and Marketing, Lincoln University,
was selected as the host institution because of the interest and work of several faculty in the
policy, macro economic, institutional and marketing areas.
In October 1995 I was approached by Dr Robert McGregor of EPAD, Chief of Domestic
Policy, Agriculture and Agriculture-Food Canada, to see if I would undertake the project.
The project was developed and agreed to in early December.
A.3 Procedures Followed
The following steps were followed in carrying out the study.
Step 1
Once the objectives of the study were agreed to, these were given to three faculty members in
Economics and Marketing at "Linc"olnUriiversity for review and comment and advice in terms
of the approach to follow, appropriate literature and suggested contacts.
The reviews all indicated that the questions that were being asked were extensive given the
short time frame of the project. Also, they felt that for certain questions there would be no
definitive answer, just opinions. In other words it may be too early to tell the lessons to be
learned in certain areas: the verdict is not fully in on questions about the results of reform in a
number of areas.
Advice was obtained on a wide range of literature in terms of background history to the
economic development of New Zealand, books and government documents on the reform
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process, studies and reports on analysing the effects of reform III general and on the
agricultural sector in particular.
The advice was that it would be necessary to interview government officials and economists in
the industry, and in particular the Departments of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF) and
Treasury. Initial contacts were suggested.
Step 2
Mr Grant McFadden of MAF in Christchurch was interviewed to provide first line contact
with MAF and to help establish further contacts., and also to provide initial information on the
structure ofMAF and the Policy Branch.
Step 3
Further advice was sought from several key individuals in MAF as well as former MAF
economists. The interviews were carried out over -asix--dayperiod in Wellington. Those
interviewed included the ChiefExecutive ofMAF, Dr Russell Ballard, his assistants, Directors
of the Policy Branch in MAF, and several other economists. Two former MAF officials, Dr
Robin Johnson and Dr Royce Elliott were important contacts. Interviews were arranged with
as many industry officials as was feasible given the time frame. An interview was arranged
with Federated Farmers as well as the agricultural advisor to the Prime Minister. The names
and addresses of those who were interviewed is contained in Appendix A.
Step 4
Sets of questions were formulated in advance to facilitate the discussion.
Step 5
The last step was to write the report. It was decided to rely on the literature where it was
available and appropriate for information and opinion on many of the questions being asked.
The approach was to cite the author(s) rather heavily so as to provide their statements on
various issues in their own words. This approach was also followed so as to avoid as much as
possible, "getting it wrong". This should help to explain the extensive use of quotations.
The other problem was the need in certain cases to protect the confidentiality of the source of
information and opinion obtained from certain people who, when interviewed, provided very
frank opinion on sensitive issues about reform and the reform process. Where this was felt to
not be a problem the source of information and opinion was provided.
A.4 Contacts Made and Those Interviewed
MINISTRY OF AGRICUI.;'fURE:~WeUington
The addresses for the following are:
ASB Bank House
101-103 The Terrace
PO Box 2526
Wellington, New Zealand
Dr Russell Ballard
Director General, MAF
MAF Directorate General
Telephone: (64)(4) 474 4100
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Dr Peter O'Hara
Deputy Director-General, MAP
MAP Directorate General
Telephone: (64)(4) 472 0367
Mr Larry Ferguson,
Assistant Director-General and Group Director
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 472 0367
Mr Alan Walker
Director, Rural Resources
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 474 4100
Mr John Askwith
Director, Policy Services
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 472 0367
Dr Ann Pomeroy
Manager, Rural Affairs
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 4744271
Mr Alwyn Shepherd
Senior Agricultural Economist
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64) (4) 474 4212
Mr Rod Forbes
Senior Analyst
MAF Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 474 4222
Mr Ray Jeffrey (on secondment from Australian Government)
Policy Advisor
MAP Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 474 4100
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, Christchurch
Mr Grant McFadden
Regional Policy Manager
MAP Agriculture Policy
68 Mandeville Street
PO Box 8640, Riccarton
Christchurch, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(3) 348 2618
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THE TREASURY
Dr Peter Bushnell
Deputy Secretary to the Treasury
The Treasury
Social Policy and Government Services Branch
PO Box 3724
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 471 5176
Mr Michael Papesch
Manager
Land and Natural Resources
The Treasury
1 The Terrace
P. O. Box 3724
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 471 5080
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY
Mr Robert Davison
Director
New Zealand Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service
Level 7 Wool House
10 Brandon Street
P. O. Box 5179
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 472 2178
Mr Nigel Mitchell
Manager, External Policy
New Zealand Dairy Board
25 The Terrace
P. O. Box 417
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 471 8300
Dr Alan Royal
Executive Director
New Zealand Meat Research and Development Council
Seabridge House, 110 Featherstone Street
P. O. Box 1975
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 499 1252
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OTHER CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS
Mr Jeremy Harding
Policy Director
Federated Farmers ofNew Zealand Inc.
Agriculture House
12 Johnson Street
P. O. Box 715
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 4737269
Dr Royce Elliott
Executive Director
New Zealand Institute of Public Administration (Inc.)
P. O. Box 5032
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 389 8776
Dr Robin Johnson (retired MAF civil servant now consulting with MAF)
Policy Consultant
c/- MAF Agriculture Policy
Telephone: (64)(4) 474 4100
Mr Owen Symmans
Adviser
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Executive Wing
Parliament Buildings
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 471 9695
UNIVERSITY
Economics and Marketing
P. O. Box 84
Lincoln University
Lincoln, Canterbury
New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 325 2500
Dr Paul Dalziel
Senior Lecturer
Dr Ralph Lattimore
Professor
Dr Jonathan Boston
Professor
Department of Political Science
Victoria University
Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone: (64)(4) 472 1000
Dr A. C. Zwart
Professor
Dr John Fairweather
Senior Researcher in Sociology
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APPENDIXB
1995/96 PURCHASE AGREEMENT
EXCERPTS FOR MAF POLICY
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APPENDIX 1.1 TRADE LffiERALIZATION
KEY RESULTSIMILESTONES
SRA3
(i) Pursuing and enhancing the open international trading system and exploiting the
successful outcome of the Uruguay Round, by addressing new forms of protection and
moving key economic relationships to a new level.
Key Result
The terms of the GATT Agreement are fully implemented.
Milestones
• Contributions to the New Zealand position on the arrangements relating to outstanding
GATT Uruguay round country specific and MFN access commitments completed to
the satisfaction of the Secretary ofForeign Affairs and Trade.
• Contributions to the New Zealand position on the structure and agenda of the GATT
WTO Committees completed to the satisfaction of the Secretary ofForeign and Trade.
• Mechanism of meeting New Zealand's compliance and reporting obligations relative to
the agriculture elements of the Uruguay Round Agreement established.
• Systems of monitoring the compliance for our major trading partners with their GATT
obligations arising from the Uruguay Round Agreements on agriculture, including SPS
measures established.
• Potential benefits and adverse impacts with respect to New Zealand agricultural
exports arising from the enlargement of the European Union are reported to the
Minister and the Secretary ofForeign Affairs and Trade.
Key Result
• New Zealand's trade policy agenda for agriculture in the post-Uruguay Round is
identified and our participation in targeted international fora is used to influence and
shape future multilateral negotiations and agreements.
Milestones
• Through collaboration with other Government agencies, industry and NGO
organisation, a New Zealand strategy for the multilateral consideration of the
interactions between environmental policies and trade liberalisation is developed.
• Negotiations on the FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources of
Food and Agriculture completed.
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• Outcomes sought by New Zealand from the next meeting of the Codex committee on
Milk and Milk Products negotiated with the New Zealand Dairy Board.
Key Result
• Agriculture and seafood sectors are helped to increase their contribution to economic
growth by MAF.
Identifying and publicising opportunities and risks from the GATT Uruguay
Round and what follow.
Facilitating implementation of the Round's results for agriculture.
Acting to support the realisation of the GATT Agreement outcomes
Milestones
• Strategic plans which maximise opportunities and identify risk in specific markets are
developed and implemented in consultation with stakeholders in the meat, dairy and
plant areas.
Key Result
• Closer trade relationships with key markets in the world are achieved through effective
negotiation of trade rules in international fora and bilateral agreements on trade
protocols.
Milestones
•
•
•
•
•
Trans-Tasman negotiations on harmonisations of food standard and agricultural and
veterinary chemicals completed.
Three position papers delivered in international standard-setting fora.
Bilateral agreements which are based on the concepts of equivalence as set out in the
GATT Sanitary/Phytosanitary Agreement will be sought with EU, Japan, Korea and
Taiwan.
Assist MFAT in exploiting possibilities for more formal trade and economic
relationships and technical cooperation withtegiona1 groups such as-APEC, AFTA,
NAFTA and individual states in Asia and the Americas.
Contract operational research and collate information on, more efficient means of
testing for pesticide residues and identifying exotic fruit fly larvae. Contract the
development and validation of data bases on pests associated with specific crops and
crop/pest associations. This work will underpin the developments of robust protocols
covering the import/export of horticultural products.
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APPENDIX 1.2.1 AGRIBUSINESS
KEY RESULTSIMILESTONES
SRA2
(ii) Establishment, implementation and monitoring of legislative frameworks for the fair
and efficient conduct of business and the operations of markets, which rewards
innovation, promotes efficiency and enhances investor confidence.
Key Result
•• Regulatory, infrastructural and institutional ar-rangements which are no longer cost-
beneficial and are prejudicial to the performance of the primary sector are amended.
Milestones
••
••
Policy development completed for legislation amendments which enable the
introduction of industry provision of front line meat inspection services.
Agricultural Compounds Bill-assist with passage of the legislation and prepare
appropriate regulations to enable new system to come into effect concurrently with
HSNO Act(estimated to be 1 July 1996). (Note the Bill should be enacted in 1995 to
achieve this target).
Key Result
• Decision-makers have access to information on trade policy, market issues, product
volume and price trends, technical standards and guides.
Milestones
•
•
Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture and 11 Issues of Agfacts
published.
A programme of regional seminars agreed with the Minister and implemented.
Key Result
•• Industry marketing and infra-structural arra.ngements which' evolve ,from informed
debate among stakeholders.
Milestones
••
••
Policy developments for the proposed Producer Boards Acts Amendment Bill
completed, taking account of proposals being developed within the agricultural
industry.
The government decides on the kiwifruit industry marketing arrangements based on
policy advice which takes account of any recommendations arising out of the industry
reVIew.
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•• The joint (MAP Treasury and MoC) work programme agreed by the responsible
Ministers on asset ownership and corporate structures and related matters pertaining to
the industry production, processing and marketing arrangements is completed.
•• Commodity Levy Act application received in respect of levies that will expire in 1996
are processed in time to avoid transition difficulties. (Note each application requires
approximately four months from conception to completion)
Key Result
•• The sectors develop pest management strategies to control and eradicate significant
pests and diseases.
Milestones
•• Policy development for amendments to the Biosecurity Act relating to the funding and
enforcement of regional pest management strategies completed by September 1995.
Key Result
•• A food safety regulatory environment which allow responsible enterprises to manage
food safety requirements as part of their own quality management.
Milestones
••
*
The review of the legislation and operational framework for food safety administration
progressed by a MAF/MoH working party to a work programme and timetable agreed
by Cabinet and targeting the acceptance of a single regulatory agency.
complete policy development for amendments to the Biosecurity Act relating to the
funding and enforcement of regional pest management strategies by September 1995.
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APPENDIX 1.2.2
LEGISLATION
1 Agricultural Compounds Bill-assist with passage of the legislation and prepare
appropriate regulations to enable new systems to come into effect concurrently with
HSNO Act (estimated to be 1/7/96)
2 Meat Act amended to allow contestability by 30.6.96
3 Biosecurity Act amended to facilitate adoptions ofPest Management Strategies.
4 Complete policy development 'and drafting for the Producer Boards Act Amendment
Bill to enable introduction to permit introduction in accordance with the 1995
legislation programme.
Regulations
Provision of advice to the Minister in respect of the following proposed regulations.
1 Regulations establishing levies under the Commodity Levies Act.
2 Regulations under the Biosecurity Act relating to cost, forms, border protection and
risk premises.
3 Animals Protection (Codes ofEthical Conduct) Regulations.
4 Animals Identification Regulations
5 Meat (Residues) Regulations and associated Game Regulations
6 Poultry Processing Regulations
7 Meat (payments) Regulations
8 Dairy Industry (Fees) Regulations
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APPENDIX 1.3.1 RURAL RESOURCES
KEY RESULTSfMILESTONES
SRA9
(i) Development of Standards and policy mechanism for achieving environmental
quality at least to domestic and international benchmarks in respect of land
degradation, water quality including effects of benchmarks run-off pollution, air
quality and contaminated sites.
(ii) Development and monitoring of policy and legislative frameworks for
management of the environmental effects of production and .. use of energy,
including C02 emission, hazardous substances and other activities within the
ambit of the Resource Management Act.
Key Result
• Practical indicators and standards of sustainable agriculture are developed and
adopted.
Milestones
• Practical indicators of sustainability in farming systems associated with soil retention
and water quality are identified through research.
• MAP's responsibilities in meeting New Zealand's obligations through the use in
industry-agreed codes, agreed management practices (including risk management) and
market mechanisms to meet sustainable agriculture objectives.
Milestones
•• The impacts of proposed local government policy statements and plans on the rural
sector are assessed and where appropriate, submissions are made.
•• Development and application of the following programs;
Best management practices for pastoral agriculture (a joint Federated
Farmers/MAF initiative)
Industry-agreed environmental standards for dairying (Dairy Environmental
Committee)
Best management practices information for dairy shed eflluent treatment, soil
erosion, soil compaction, nitrogen use and spray use (joint initiatives with
industry groups).
•• Quarterly reports are prepared for the Minister which comment on the application of
the Resource Management Act by regional and district councils with particular
reference to impact on agriculture and horticulture.
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Key Result
• "Landcare" groups and focus farms are established for the transfer of experience and
information to other land users
Milestones
• Community of interest groups including landcare groups (15), agricultural advisory
groups (2) rural development groups (7) and seminars and field days (20) are serviced.
(Five demonstrations properties integrating good farm management's and environmental
practices for use in demonstration purposes are maintained)
Key Result
• Integrated development of communities and agricultural industries
Milestones
• Proposal on integrated rural development of communities policies to be prepared for
the Minister's consideration by 31/12/95
Operational Research
• Expressions of interest have been sought on the following topics:
(a) factors affecting the rate of adoptions of new technologies and practices in
agriculture,
(b) mechanisms of assessing progress toward sustainable agriculture. especially
indicators of
soil health
land degradation
- water quality
- air quality
that farmers can use or might apply at the catchment scale;
(c) the role of potential value of soil nematodes as indicators for agro-system health,
(d) options for on-farm utilisation of dairy shed effluent,
(e) methane production from agricultural systems in relation to climate change:
mechanisms and rates ofproduction and potential mitigation measures,
(t) nitrogen budgets and the dairy industry,
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(g) the importance of clovers as sources of nitrate contamination of groundwater,
(h) drought proofing strategies for pastoral agriculture,
(i) collective non-regulatory responses for addressing land degradation or water quality
problems caused by agriculture (non-point source pollution),
G) the potential use of specific economic instruments in achieving sustainable agricultural
in New Zealand.
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APPENDIXC
CHRONOLOGY
STABILISATION AND LIBERALISATION
MEASURES IN NEW ZEALAND
1978-1993
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Year Measure Introduced/Announced (by category)
1978 Exchange Rate Policy- Announcement of intentions to manage an overvalued
exchange rate to provide incentives to exporting industries.
Domestic Product Markets - Introduction of 'Supplementary Minimum Price'
(SMP) schemes for wool, meat and dairy.
Agricultural Finance Market-Introduction of the rural 'land development
encouragement' scheme (LDEL)
1979 Exchange Rate Policy (June-)-Relaxation-of controls on purchase of exchange
and introduction of'crawling peg' -exchange rate.
Commercial Policy (June)
- Introduction of 'Export Performance Tax Incentive' scheme replacing the
'Increased Exports Taxation Incentive' (1963).
- 'Industry Plans' developed for 17 industries with intention to Increase
international competitiveness.
Agricultural Finance Market-Introduction ofvendor finance scheme.
1980 Domestic Product Markets-Removal of discretionary licensing of export
slaughterhouses.
- Introduction of Poultry Board to join the already established boards for meat
(1922), dairy (1938) wheat (1965), town milk (1967) and pork (1974).
1981 Commercial Policy (November) - Commencement of tendering of increasing
number of import licenses for non "Industry Plan' industries.
- Start of conversion of protection to tariffs alone.
Domestic Product Markets - Legislation establishing account for meat to join
the already established accounts for dairy (1954) and wool (1976).
1982 Exchange Rate Policy (June) - Fixed exchange rate reintroduced. Monetary
policy (June) - Introduction of a freeze on wages and prices, and controls on
interest rates limiting government stock rates to 8% and first mortgage rates to
11%.
1983 Commercial Policy (January) - Announcement of Closer Economic Relations
(CER) agreement with Australia, with commitment to freer trade and financial
integration.
Fiscal Policy (September) - Ceiling of $750 million placed on Reserve Bank
advance to Dairy Board (effective from 1 January 1984).
1984 Monetary Policy - Price freeze partially lifted early in 1984, then gradually for
other commodities in last half
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Domestic Product Markets (June) - Announcement of intentions to end SMP
scheme.
Commercial Policy June) - Producer Board reserve account at Reserve Bank to
be charged commercial interest rates.
Exchange Rate Policy (July) - following a major capital outflow, the newly
elected government undertook a devaluation of 20% against a basket of .
currencies ofmajor trading partners.
Financial Markets (July) - Market deregulated. Credit growth guidelines
abolished and marginal ratio policy applicable to finance companies removed.
Controls on interest·bearing-<leposits removed
- (August) - Further deregulation with two additional controls on interest rates
being removed.
Commercial Policy (August)
- Announcement of programme to phase out export incentives and to increase
access for imported goods.
- (October) - Announcement of abolition ofWheat Board.
Labour Policy (November) - Wage freeze lifted and annual wage rounds
preceded by tripartite talks set up.
Fiscal Policy (November) - Announcement in Budget of phasing out of
fertiliser and noxious weeds subsidies, lowering of irrigation and water supply
subsidies, partial cost recovery on product inspection reintroduced (December
1985) and Rural Bank and Finance Corporation (RBFC) interest rates raised
progressively (by 1% annually) to market rates. Investment taxation
allowance allowed to expire and form vendor finance scheme ended.
(November) - Introduction of value added tax announced commenced October
1986)
1985 Domestic Financial Market (February) - Abolition of 'compulsory rate system'
requiring financial institutions to invest in government and public securities.
Exchange Rate Policy (March) - New Zealand dollar floated on 4th and
Reserve Bank role shifts to control of monetary policy.
Fiscal Policy (April) - Crown assets of $2.765 billion transferred to Stated
Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
(June) - Ten year clawback and loss limitation taxation provisions repealed,
land development concessions phased out and livestock standard value system
modified. New procedures for controlling expenditure growth and significant
reduction in 1985/86 deficit to 2.8% ofGDP forecast.
Commercial Policy (June) - Commitment made to phasing out assistance to
land based and manufacturing industry.
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Domestic Product Markets - Phosphate Commission abolished (June).
Marketing and Price Controls of Poultry Board to be abolished 1 April 1986
(September), termination of Meat Board Sheep Pool and trade returned to the
private sector (November).
1986 Fiscal policy (May) - Introduction of cost recovery of advisory, research,
animal health and quarantine services, while MAF budget to be progressively
reduced.
(July) - First year depreciation allowance withdrawn.
(October) - Goods and Services Tax (GST) commenced at 10%.
Agricultural Finance Markets (July) - announcement of RBFC discounting
loans scheme (applications closed July 1987).
1987 Domestic Product Markets (January) ... Wheat Board disbanded.
(March) - Write-off ofMeat Income Stabilisation Account (MISA) debt.
Commercial Policy (April) - Creation ofnine State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
Fiscal Policy (June) - Announced sale of government assets to payoff public
debt, an measures to reduce tax evasion.
(December) - Announcement of major tax and tariff reforms including raising
GST to 12.5%, and reduced personal and company tax rates (from 1 October
1988). Full dividend imputation scheme and superannuation funds to be
subject to tax from 1 April 1988.
Commercial Policy (December) - A four year programme to tariff reductions,
and a two-step reduction in duty on motor vehicles announced.
1988 Fiscal Policy (January) - The earlier announced flat personal income tax rate
and guaranteed minimum family income proposals abandoned.
(July) - Review of state sector to promote efficiency and productivity
announced. Tax cuts and maintenance of reduced budget surplus announced
and also intended reduction in overseas debt. (December) - Announcement of
major new tax legislation with reference to imputation, international,
provisional and trusts taxes.
Domestic Product Markets (April) - Milk Board abolished.
(September)~·:I~Jwifruit:MatketiI1g'Authority~became·the Kiwifruif Marketing
Board with increased powers.
(December) - Poultry Board abolished.
1989 Fiscal Policy (March) - Real cuts in operational expenditure of all government
departments. New finance minister Caygill signals continuation of the
Rogernomics strategy following the departure from Cabinet of Roger Douglas
in December 1988 amid controversy with the Prime Minister over the handling
of economic and social policy.
(July) - Announcement in budget of intention of a zero fiscal deficit in the
1990/91 year.
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- Announcement that inspection services by MAF Quality Management move
to full cost recovery by July 1990.
(November) - Announcement of new measures for local government
authorities.
Monetary Policy (May) - A new Reserve Bank Bill introduced to Parliament
which sets the achievement and maintenance of price stability as Reserve
Bank's primary objective.
(July) - Budget includes the restatement of0-2% inflation target for 1992.
Agricultural Finance market (August) - Rural Bank (RBFC) sold to private
interests.
1990 Monetary Policy (February) - Reserve Bank Act 1989 came into force.
(May) - tightening of monetary conditions by raising of the minimum float
tender.
(June) - setting up of the New Zealand financial Markets Committee.
Fiscal Policy (March) - Finance Minister Cayill releases an economic statement
detailing further economic reform including: revision of the Companies Act on
mergers and takeovers; removal of restrictions on overseas ownership of ports;
restructuring of New Zealand Rail for corporatisation; tariff reductions 1991-
1996; proposed new Labour Relations Act with more flexible work practices;
intention to sell Telecom.
(July) - Budget measures including abolition of excise duties on diesel and
motor vehicle; tax simplification measures to reduce avoidance.
(December) - The new National Government's Economic Package included:
across-the-board benefit cuts; abolition of family benefit with rise in more
targeted family support; cuts in health subsidies; end of compulsory unionism.
Science Funding and Policy (late 1990) - policy to establish new Crown
Research Institutes announced.
Commodities Levies Act provides for compulsory levies on commodities to
fund general development of specific industries.
1991 Monetary Policy (March) - New safeguards introduced for the banking industry
after DFC failure.
Labour Policy (May) - Employment Contract Act took effect.
Fiscal Policy (July) - budget included: restructuring of health funding and
charging and funding of public housing; higher levies on petrol and wages to
fund ACC; higher alcohol and tobacco excise.
Resource"Management:(October)" :':"'Resource'Manag;emeilf Act took effect,
aimed at sustainable management of natural resources.
1992 Monetary Policy (March) - Standdard and Poors reaffirm the AA - rating of
New Zealand's long term debt.
(October) - underlying inflation 1.5%.
(December) - Dr Brash reappointed as Governor of the Reserve Bank. New
inflatIon targets set at 0-2% rise in CPI.
Agricultural Regulations Reform - Dairy Board Amendment Act passed making
the Board more independent of Government and more accountable to
producers and the industry. Changes were proposed in several other areas,
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including weed and pest management, import risk management, agricultural
compounds, primary produce certification, animal welfare and producer boards.
1993 Livestock Taxation (year ending March) - Substantial changes made to
livestock valuations for tax purposes. Trading Stock Scheme repealed, Herd
Scheme retained with some changes.
Energy Sector Reform (April) - Energy Sector Reform Act took effect.
Electricity Supply Authorities established as corporate entities, with likelihood
offuture privatisation.
Assistance to Agriculture (1992/93) - Effective rate of assistance to agriculture
falls to -3% compared to 52% ten years ago.
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